



UPLIFT – Urban PoLicy Innovation to address
inequality with and for Future generaTions

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Summary

- With the Covid-19 pandemic, France entered – one of the most serious economic and social crises in its history, highlighting and/or aggravating existing inequalities that divide the French society. The French social model and policies against inequality may cushion this shock better than other countries' economic and policy frameworks, but at the same time, it continues to leave too many people on the margins of societal progress, notably young people.
- In accordance with the Methodological Guidance and Work Plan for WP2 of the UPLIFT project, this report examines the scales and dimensions of inequality in the functional urban area (FUA/aire d'attraction) of Mulhouse. National, regional and local dynamics, as well as policy interventions are analysed to find out how the drivers of socio-economic inequality operate.
- The analysis is based on desk research and interviews with five key stakeholders at the local level, and one housing expert on the national level, as well as on relevant findings presented in previous deliverables of the UPLIFT project. After presenting the FUA, we introduce to the the main trends and policies in four thematic areas – education, employment, housing and gender equality as a key cross sectional and structural factor for (in-)equality, distinguishing between national, regional and local developments.
- Particularly young people, people with low education and people with migration background face a relatively high unemployment or inactivity risk. The secondary and tertiary education sector react with increasingly local and tailor-made approaches. Innovation in education and youth-work addresses more empowerment- than care-oriented approaches, which is a shift from the traditional French state's self-concept of a centralised care-oriented model of government. It is today supported by more governance-oriented policy implementation structures on the regional (*département Haut-Rhin*) and local (*Mulhouse Alsace Agglomération (m2A) and municipalité*) levels. Labour market policies addressing inequality mainly focus on activation and training of the unemployed and inactive population, particularly the young. Particularly young people however risk precarity due to often short term and/or part time contracts.
- Housing policies address – notably for the Mulhouse FUA population structure - better accessibility for young people and a more differentiated structure of the social housing stock. Not least, they started to respond to the increasing demand for self-organised housing projects in cooperation with social actors. In terms of insertion, also home-ownership forms part of both social mix (*mixité*) and inclusion-oriented housing policies. For young households however, becoming a homeowner is often a difficult or impossible step. However, it is considered to form part of socio-economic empowerment and

promoting social home ownership is thus a major challenge for attracting young households to the FUA and m2A.

- Local implementation of state policies against youth inequality is to a major extent embedded in a reformed structure of the *Politique de la Ville* which may today rather be considered as *institution* than as *policy*. On the Mulhouse FUA/m2A level, its implementation benefits from the *Agence d'Urbanisme de la Région Mulhosuienne* (AURM), a strong actor providing knowleged-transfer and strategic consultancy to local public actors. For policies against youth inequality, the enforcement of cooperation with centres for youth-work and youth- and family educational work of NGOs is essential. However, the broad offer of instruments and approaches to social inclusion and empowerment of young people lacks in part accessibility, due to lacking coordination of the information/knowledge that is necessary to access it.
- The improvement of gender equality is as in all European countries a legal and structural duty, based on national frameworks, its implementation is supported by an institutional framework on the regional level of the *département*. The latter provides the regional authority for the *Service des droits des femmes et de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes* (SDFE, Service for Women's Rights and Gender Equality on the national level) and the gender equality representative on the level of the municipality. Gender disaggregated statistics are provided in an also for practioners easily accessible manner, and many women empowerment measures are on course in the traditional fields of women empowerment. However, a more complex gender mainstreaming perspective became less visible in the research, notably concerning needs of young men and LGBT+ and, in the *Politique de Ville* framework, concerning housing and urban development issues.

Introduction

This report examines the scales and dimensions of inequality affecting the young population in the functional urban area (FUA/aire d'attraction) of Mulhouse/France. With regard to local practice and data availability, the report however refers to a large extent to the agglomeration m2A. The first chapter, a generic description of the FUA, highlights key local and regional characteristics and how they compare with the country as a whole. It introduces the reader to the territory and its characteristics. Our purpose is to explain how the drivers of socio-economic inequality operate in this local context, as well as the role of policy interventions in aggravating or reducing the impacts of inequality on the urban youth. Therefore, particular attention is paid to the room for action of local policies and the manners in which policy-makers and stakeholders conceptualize and respond to the existing challenges. This corresponds to the three-level analysis in the UPLIFT project, and is followed by a presentation of the main trends and policies for the policy areas education, employment, housing and gender equality at the national, regional and local level. Afterwards, an innovative case of self-employment policy for young people in the context of ERASMUS+ is described in greater detail and as example for a capability-oriented approach in youth employment policies. Finally, we summarise and discuss the main findings. The annex of the report provides data and maps of the Mulhouse FUA.

Building on previous deliverables of the UPLIFT project, this report expands the data collection and analysis by bringing in additional desk research and interviews with five local experts and one housing expert on the national level. The interviewees were selected for their relevant knowledge and experience in the FUA, in terms of strategic development in the analysed fields of action, and also to ensure a combination of public service perspectives, an affordable housing perspective and a non-governmental organisation (NGO) perspective to enable a critical assessment of the findings and identified policy impacts.¹ Given that UPLIFT has no further activities in Mulhouse and also due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it was hardly possible to find interview partners: Several requests remained unanswered, and only five of the eight planned interviews could be carried out. However, the communication with the socio-cultural centre – whose project *Coopération active et potentiel* (CAP) is introduced in chapter 3 – evolved quite well.

¹ Three of the interviewees are local strategic experts, one works for a social housing company and one at an NGO socio-cultural family- and youth centre. Three of our interviewees are women and three of them men, other sexual orientation or identity was not obvious for us. In the pandemic background, public administration established in part contact with the interview partners, but was not available for interviews herself, and neither was the political institutional level. All interviews were due to the pandemic context carried out online and lasted at minimum 90 minutes. They were recorded, turned into operational notes and analysed comparatively.

The desk research was carried out between December 2020 and October 2021, with the aim of analysing relevant literature on the four thematic areas of analysis: education, employment, housing and gender equality as a cross-sectional driver of inequality. Sources include data and reports from public bodies (OECD, French governmental/nongovernmental institutions in responsibility of urban polices, *Agence d'Urbanisme de la Région Mulhousienne* (AURM), EIGE, and academic publications). The source of statistical data used in this report is – unless specified differently – Insee.

Special attention was given to studies that scrutinise the patterns and structures of and instruments against inequality of young people in the context of inclusive urban development. The chapter on housing/urban development forms thus the core part of the report.

Generally, the intended time spanning reflection/perspective was difficult to pursue, notably in the discussion with local experts who haven't been in their positions throughout the nearly more than one and half decades between 2008 and today.

1 General description of Mulhouse Functional Urban Area

Mulhouse is a centre of the trinational/transnational metropolitan region of Basel-Mulhouse-Freiburg, linking France, Germany and Switzerland. Situated at the banks of the Rhine-Rhone canal, the city is furthermore crossed by two watercourses, the *Doller* and the *Rhine Inflow III*. The agglomeration is well accessible by motorways and public transport. Long distance, inter-district and inter-communal relations benefit from the high-speed train lines TGV Est / Rhine-Rhône.

The Mulhouse FUA and the city (*commune*) of Mulhouse which are the relevant target areas of national and local policies, have been hit hard by the industrial crisis of recent years: The unemployment rate, which was until the 2000s much lower than in the rest of France, is now much higher (18% higher for the FUA, 90% higher for the city of Mulhouse; see appendix).

The architecture of Mulhouse is characterised by different industrial periods, and the supply of single-family homes is low. The city traditionally housed the workers in the city centre, the well-off households on the outskirts and the higher parts of the city. Having a poorer population in the centre than in the periphery is according to the expert interviews not a classical socio-spatial pattern for a de-industrialised French city of this size. In the 1960s, new large social housing estates were constructed, for sheltering working class groups. They soon became predominantly the homes of migrant families, followed by other vulnerable groups. Until today, the inner-city old neighbourhoods are – according to the interviews neighbourhoods, *"where the inhabitants are financially and socially precarious, even in poor health. Also, according to the figures of the Regional Observatory of Integration and the City, Mulhouse concentrates one third of the immigrant population of Haut Rhin. It is a city of 140 nationalities, which opens up the debate on whether it functions as a melting pot of cultures or as a simple juxtaposition."*

However, whereas parts of the inner city still require intervention to fight inequality, the city achieved during the last decade remarkable change in other parts of the centre. There, it benefits from its major advantages, such as the cross-border location, the history of industrial innovation and a creative dynamism. Being a decade ago a symbol of the death of the European high street, for factory closures and industrial decline, Mulhouse is today known for the staggering transformation of its centre, in contrast to the national trend for high street closures. A unique structural aspect of this development is that 75% of new openings are small independent start-ups, such as book stores, microbreweries and other lifestyle-oriented business, with as many independents as franchises. Furthermore, a diagnostic of the city for the 2015-2020 *Politique de la Ville* contract considers the young Mulhouse population to be an asset for further development (AURM 2015).

This development is in part related to the creation of the m2A in 2010, a reaction on both de-industrialisation and financial crisis. Since, inter-communal integration is progressive, aiming at

social and solidarity issues, e. g. in the context of the *Politique de la Ville* policies (2007-2014). From 2010, m2A focused on issues of economic development, employment and transport, but also on housing, the reception of travellers, improvement of the quality of early childhood and education through extracurricular activities, sustainable development and energy. However, the continuity of the crisis required specific, cross-departmental policies and instruments to achieve stronger social cohesion. m2A is embedded in the complex French urban renewal system and a new *single* contract for the *Politique de la Ville*: This new generation of city-based contracts replaced in 2015 for a period of six years (2015-2020) the urban social cohesion contracts (CUCS), which constituted the framework for action of the *Politique de la Ville* in urban policy from 2007 to 2014. The Urban Renewal Programme (*Programme Renouvellement Urbain*, PRU I), has been supplemented since 2015 by the New Urban Renewal Programmes (NPNRU) and was integrated into this new single contract. The actions of the NPNRU have a longer duration, until 2024, and shall be consistent with the new single contract. The latter retains, according to a single criterion of poverty rate, the Priority Neighbourhoods of the *Politique de la Ville* (QPV) in m2A. The structure of the single contracts integrates

- a single contract integrating the social, urban and economic dimensions
- a contract piloted at the intermunicipal level and mobilising all the partners concerned
- a contract mobilising, as a priority, the common law of the state and local authorities
- a contract that is part of a process of co-construction with the inhabitants

Social cohesion-oriented urban renewal in Mulhouse focuses in this context at present six priority neighbourhoods/target areas (*La Fonderie, Le Drouot, Les Coteaux, avenue Aristide Briand, Franklin-Fridolin, Vauban-Neppert, Wolf-Wagner, see map in the appendix*). The fields of action/interventions established are typical for integrative neighbourhood development, such as improvement of existing housing, development of public spaces and urban quality of life, integration of inhabitants through employment, education and training for especially low qualified (young) people and participation and consultation of the inhabitants on different project and planning levels.

An important example with regard to the participation of young vulnerable population is that the city of Mulhouse took on the lead of 2010-2012 URBACT programme TOGETHER for territories of co-responsibility.² A core issue of this programme, which developed long term local sustainability and international network lasting until today, is a *Multipartite Social Contract* with long-term unemployed people and basic guaranteed income beneficiaries. The purpose of this contract is to achieve social inclusion in a collaboration/partnership and reciprocity rather than within the

² <https://wikispiral.org/tiki-index.php?page=Info&CGname=Mulhouse&itemId=111426>

traditional; paternalistic care/client relationship. The project pursued the co-responsibility approach SPIRAL, “an approach of collective learning aiming at gradually building, from the local level to the global one, the ability of society to ensure the well-being of all through co-responsibility between its different stakeholders: citizens, public and private actors”.³ Amongst the projects and actors involved were a parents’ centre, a school, a self-help housing project, and *Jean Wagner Sociocultural Centre* (see also chapter 3).

Governance

Mulhouse is the seat of the sub-prefecture (*sous-préfecture*) of the agglomeration in the *Haut Rhin* department and since 2017, it has for the first time in its history a women mayor. The city forms part of the *Grand Est* region (NUTS region FR400)⁴ and is the biggest city of the region’s department (*département*) *Haut-Rhin* (NUTS region FR422). On the inter-regional level, the FUA Mulhouse (Code Insee 029) includes 132 municipalities. Dijkstra et al. explained that the OECD concept of FUA goes beyond aspects of population size and density, in order to consider also the functional and economic extent of cities (2019). The French FUA concept was from 2010 organised by ‘zoning in urban areas’ (*zonage en aires urbaines*, ZAU), replaced by ‘zoning in city attraction areas’ (*zonage en aire d’attraction*, ZAA) in 2020.⁵ However, the administrative collaboration *agglomération m2A*, including 39 municipalities, forms since 2016 the structural framework to which more policies seem to refer.

Population

The Mulhouse FUA had 409,981 inhabitants in 2018. Since 2008, its population has been increasing by 1,4%. The department’s population however grew by 2,5%, which is lower than national rate of growth of 4,3%. The city of Mulhouse had 108,942 inhabitants in 2018, with a population decrease of 2,6% from 2008 to 2018.⁶ 21,7% of the city’s population are foreign

³ https://wikispiral.org/tikiindex.php?page=SPIRAL+approach&structure=New+menu&latest=1&page_ref_id=797

⁴ The Grand Est region includes 87 of the 699 French aires d’attraction. Covering 3,847 municipalities, these are home to 92% of the population. Available at: <https://www.Insee.fr/fr/information/4803954>

⁵ The National Statistical Institute (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Insee) defines the ‘attraction area of a city’ by the extent of its influence on the surrounding municipalities. The areas are ranked according to the total number of people in the area in 2017. The ‘attraction areas of cities’ were established in 2020, with reference to commuting patterns known from the 2016 census. Source: <https://www.Insee.fr/fr/information/4803954>, as of 17/09/2021. Last visited in January 2022.

⁶ Source of all data used in this report and its annex is – if not stated otherwise – the Insee database.

populations⁷, which is significantly higher than on the national level (7,1%). The share of people aged 15-29 years in the city has been rather stable, with 22% of the population in 2008 and 21% ten years later. 2,1% of the city's inhabitants aged 15-24 in 2018 were of foreign populations (0,7% at the national level). But due to the global decrease of inhabitants, the absolute figure of young people (15-29 years) has decreased (-8%) for all local levels (*Haut Rhin*, FUA, city), contrasting with a slight growth (2%) at the national level. Between 2013 and 2018, the share of women within the population in Mulhouse, m2A and *Grand Est* remained stable with 51%, with a slight difference to the national level (52%). In 2018, 10,9% of the Mulhouse population were women in foreign populations. Within the population younger than 30 years, 41% in Mulhouse are women, significantly more than in the region *Grand Est* (33%) and on the national level (34%) (Corneille & Lutz 2021).

Mulhouse is characterised by a high share of vulnerable populations. The Gini index calculated at national level remained from 2008 – 2018 under 0,3% and thus slightly lower than the European Union average level. The local Gini index (2015) seems very high for Mulhouse (0,48), and high in the FUA (0,39) while the *Haut Rhin* performs close to the national ratio. The share of population at risk of poverty rate increased slightly from 2008 to 2018, but is considered by the interviewed experts to remain stable for 2019 and 2020, despite the Covid-19 crisis (*crise sanitaire*). However, the share of people aged 18-29 at risk of poverty has strongly increased from 2008 to 2018. The share in the department *Haut Rhin* is with 12,9% lower than the national rate (14,8%), but on the contrary the share in the FUA is higher (15,4%) and the rate in the city of Mulhouse is very high, reaching 40%. This rate is also much higher than in towns with similar socio-economic structure, within the region *Grand Est*.

Economy

Mulhouse is considered a pioneer of the industrial revolution in France: First the textile industry developed, later the chemical and mechanical sectors were added. However, after an economic boom in the three decades post World War II (*trente glorieuses*), the city has been struggling with the decline of its textiles and mechanical engineering industries, and thus with the challenges of deindustrialisation and structural change. Analysis of the economic development between 2008 and today is rather available on the level of the Mulhouse agglomeration (m2A) than with reference to the Mulhouse FUA. An evaluation of the *Agence d'Urbanisme de Mulhouse* (AURM), analysing how the different branches and territories have gone through both the structural change and the financial crisis 2007/2008, and how they achieved the recovery observed since 2015,

⁷ Foreigners are by the Insee definition persons who reside in France but do not have French nationality. Insee specifies that only foreigners with a permanent residence in France, those who work or study there are counted. These data don't represent all populations with immigrant background.

concludes that at the end of 2017, m2A had not managed to recover its pre-crisis level of salaried employment. The territory was notably weighed down by the destruction of jobs in the automotive industry, linked with an increased productivity through automation. But despite a net loss of 6,278 industrial jobs in m2A between 2007-2017, automotive industry continues to account for almost half of the industrial workforce in the region and Mulhouse remains an industrial hub: after textile industries slowed down, chemical and pharmaceutical production took its place (AURM, 2019).

Today, there are around 6,470 companies in the city, including PSA Peugeot Citroën car factory (the largest employer in Alsace with over 10,000 employees), chemical industries (ICMD), electronic industries (Clemessy) and a mechanical engineering company (Wärtsilä). Also, enterprises in the biotech, medical and transport industries have been drawn to the city: A special feature of the 'Regio TriRhena' are its strong cultural, administrative, cultural and economic links and the infrastructure across the national borders that support collaboration. The broader metropolitan area of Mulhouse and the cross-border region is – despite the economic struggle of the Mulhouse FUA – estimated to be one of the regions with highest per capita GDPs in Europe.

Also, a joint market analysis by a private real estate agency and a labour market analyst concludes that the pandemic and the generalization of digital processes might have led to change in parts of the French society and places like Mulhouse should gain attractiveness with their mobility resources, low housing cost and interesting commercial structures at favourable prices.⁸ This means that the private sector might meanwhile consider the city to be attractive for investment in innovation. Three recent axes to promote innovation are *KMØ*, a *cité* of industry and digital technology in the *Fonderie* district, and *Quartier DMC*, a former industrial site that is now housing creative industries and cultural projects such as *Building 75* that is home to MOTOCO, which houses 140 artists in residence and organises numerous cultural events. The 3rd axis of intervention consists of projects relating to the energy and ecological transition.

The AURM report however also indicates a development that is expected to strengthen inequality: Half of the m2A employees are employed in industrial sectors that are shedding fairly well-paid jobs, and increase low-paying activities with precarious employment, often part-time.

Youth participation

The city has for quite a while started to introduce community-oriented, cross-generational social practices striving to reduce inequality and conflict, such as the TOGETHER project (see chapter 2.3) Place-based projects have helped building pathways towards integration, and institutions like children and youth councils – within which young women are better represented than young men

⁸ <https://www.meilleurtaux.com/credit-immobilier/etude-immobilier/2022/emploi-logement-le-classement-des-villes-ou-s-installer.html>

(Corneille/Lutz 2021) – are by the city seen as success stories. In contrast, experts interviewed for this report request support for more spontaneous forms of self-organisation, and also more opportunities to link up formal and informal approaches, in order to better include young people in the process of collaboratively shaping urban institutions and spaces.

2 Findings

2.1. Education

The French education system is centralised and thus characterised by a strong state presence in the organisation and funding of education. It is regulated by the *Ministère de l'éducation nationale et la jeunesse* (Ministry for National Education and Youth). Within the framework defined by the parliament, which states the fundamental principles of education, the ministry governs the educational system, its personnel structures and quality management and defines the details of curricula at all education levels. It is the main funding body of the public education system and also subsidises so called "private schools under contract" which receive approximately 20% of the French pupils. Due to a great loss of confidence in the performance of state schools, about 9000 Catholic Church schools and other public schools, all called *écoles libres* (free schools), enrol about 30 % of the French pupils. Since 2005, all school institutions are obliged to admit children with disabilities, based on *LOI n° 2005-102 pour l'égalité des droits et des chances, la participation et la citoyenneté des personnes handicapées* (2005, Law on Equal Rights and Opportunities).⁹

2.1.1. National and regional trends and policies

Decentralisation Acts (1982-1983/2003-2004) devolved limited powers to local authorities who since have been playing an increasingly significant part in education governance, ensuring the material operation of the system. In the case of new buildings, the municipalities determine the reception capacity, location and type of accommodation for pupils – in consultation with the prefect of the *département* (in the case of Mulhouse Dpt. *Haut-Rhin*).

The realisation of education policies and administration of educational institutions are essentially carried out by 30 *académies*, each of which is responsible for several *départements*. The academy rector and the academy inspector determine the educational structure of the institutions, and the ministry appoints the teaching staff. Within the *académies* exist 97 *Directions des services départementaux de l'éducation nationale* (DSDN), being responsible for steering and monitoring the implementation of national policies. The school system is largely run by the public sector, with public universities and grammar schools as local public educational institution (EPLE). In the higher

⁹ <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000000809647>; for more detailed information on the educational system see the European Union's educational platform Eurydice, <https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-education-systems/france/overview> and the homepage of the Académie de Strasbourg, <https://www.ac-strasbourg.fr/media/16252/download>

education sector, non-governmental providers are more strongly represented in the *grandes écoles* (specialised universities, training the leadership elites in state), the Catholic Church is more involved in the private school sector.

Schools in France are basically all-day schools. Education is since 2019 compulsory from the age of 3 to 16, and must be completed with a vocational or university training until the age of 18 (or older). The education system builds on modules: primary education (three years nursery school (*maternelle*) and five years primary school (*école élémentaire*), secondary education (secondary education I / *collège*, four years; secondary education II / *lycée*, three years) and higher education (accessible after the *baccalauréat*, graduation obtained at the *lycée*).

Inequalities in the educational context - between equal opportunities and elite education

The French Republic is based on the promise of equality for all citizens, beginning with early education, but already in 2006, the structure of the academic system and the instruments to prevent educational segregation from primary education on have been heavily criticised. The *Conseil national d'évaluation du système scolaire* (cnesco, National board for the evaluation of the school system) uses for its 2016 scientific analysis on the role of the school system in amplifying social and migration related inequalities the approach of cnesco/Felouzis et al (2016), who employed two theories to explain the origins of social inequalities and their amplification by schools: *Cultural discontinuity* (family dimension of inequalities) and *systemic discrimination* (institutional dimension, an educational offer that is in fact not "*indifferent to differences*", but gives more to those pupils who already have more). Therefore, cnesco concludes that instead of 'equality of opportunity' only a "*common base of knowledge, skills and culture*", namely a "*fair equality of opportunity*", would ensure that the fate of the most disadvantaged no longer depends on their initial positions (ibid 2016).

One of the first instruments for equality in education, is the system of the *Carte Scolaire*, established in 1963 to prevent a ghettoization of the suburbs. It more or less failed because in reality, many parents, mainly from the middle and upper classes, circumvent the *Carte Scolaire* regulation by sending their children to private schools. Social mixing became an illusion, from *collège* onwards: Out of 109 public schools in Paris, children from wealthy parents made up 46 % of the student body in the sixth grade, of the student body in the top 58 schools. In contrast, 18 % of pupils came from socially weaker backgrounds. At the same time, only 7 % of students in the 17 worst schools came from wealthy families, while the proportion of children of workers and the unemployed was 51 % (Weber 2006).

Despite attempts to reform the system since that time, qualitative research during the last decade attested to the French education system a cold, distant and insulated image of society. Schools are accused to focus primarily on imparting knowledge. Everyday life aspects of pupils and students, especially their culture, are often neglected in school. The French school and educational

system were only a few years ago still considered *"to be hardly adapted to the challenges of the contemporary world"* (Jakob/Giraud, 2018) and rather reinforce than compensate for the advantages and disadvantages of social background, and suffer from socio-spatial segregation. Every year 100,000 young people in France, mainly from socially disadvantaged backgrounds, leave school without qualifications and can hardly be integrated into the labour market. Part of this problem is the persistence of the strong private school sector, being resistant to state intervention concerning the inclusion of socially deprived groups of children/young people (Villinger, 2018).

Another driver of inequality is – similar to other European countries – immigration background.¹⁰ Specific for France is in this context its tradition of secularism, consisting a main barrier for public debate on the issue of origin-based discrimination, notably where it is linked to issues of religion: Despite the riots that have taken place since 2005 in the banlieues, any form of differential treatment of population groups on the basis of ethnicity remains simply taboo in France. Children and young people with a migrant background are thus particularly affected by the polarisation effects generated by the school system. In 2015, 23 % of young adults aged 25-34 with two foreign-born parents left the French school system with a low educational qualification (Jakob/Giraud, 2018). Awareness of the problem of inequality and its social consequences has grown over the years, but the government under Prime Minister Edouard Philippe has been criticised for too many and not sufficiently implemented reforms within the educational system.

Nevertheless, the OECD better life index (2020) identifies that the French can – with hardly any gender difference – expect to go through 16.6 years of education between the age of 5 and 39 years, which is beyond the OECD average of 18 years. This result must however be differentiated on the territorial levels. Also, the gaps between the strongest and the weakest pupils are among the highest of all countries studied in the PISA study.

As for the graduation from upper secondary education, to be understood as a guarantee for meeting minimum requirements of the job market, 81% of adults aged 25-64 have completed this educational status (obtained by 81% of men, compared to 82% women). France ranges here above the OECD average of 79%, but this result tells little about the quality of education received: In 2018, the PISA study focused on examining students' reading ability, skills in maths and level in sciences, as more reliable predictors of economic and social well-being than the years of education. In these areas, the average French student scored 494, above the OECD average of 488 (girls outperforming boys by an average of 6 points). At the same time, according to the PIRLS/IGLU study (2017), the average reading proficiency of French fourth graders worsened by a total of 14 points between 2001 and 2016.

¹⁰ See footnote 9 for the French legal differentiation of population with immigration background.

In the context of a strong institutional and civil society criticism of the educational system notably in deprived neighbourhoods, the new government implemented six reforms. The first addressed in 2017 primary schools: 869 zones with increased educational needs established the so-called *Réseaux d'Éducation Prioritaire* (REP) or *Réseaux d'éducation priori (REP+)*, where the first primary school classes are reduced to twelve pupils. Reform II (2019) addressed compulsory education for all children from the age of three. Reform III addressed the qualification and income of teachers, notably in REP+ schools. Reform IV addressed the structure of the *baccalauréat*, which had already passed major reforms in 1985 (implementation of a vocational *Baccalauréat*, a *Baccalauréat général*, a *Baccalauréat technologique* and a *Baccalauréat professionnel* combining scholarly education and professional education) and 1995 (*Baccalauréat général* differentiated into three types). It has in this context developed from a qualification reserved primarily for young people from the bourgeoisie to a school-leaving qualification attained by almost 80% of a birth cohort and is "one of the last rites of passage into adulthood, a symbol of equality in an unequal society"¹¹. Reform VI addressed the introduction of selection criteria for study programmes at public universities and thus the access to academic studies (Villinger, 2018).

Given the despite these reforms still increasing numbers of NEET (neither in employment, education or training; cf. chapter 2.2 and annex), the law of 28 July 2019 for an *École de la confiance* (school of confidence) stipulates that all young people aged 16 to 18 must be offered an apprenticeship or a job by local missions, from 2020. Furthermore, the *Écoles françaises de la deuxième chance* (Second Chance Schools), and apprenticeships as door-opener to the labour-market have been established.

Écoles de la deuxième chance: combining individual education plans with work placements

The *Écoles de la deuxième chance* help young adults between 18 and 25 improve their skills to get a job, if they have been out of school for over a year and do not have a diploma or other qualification. An individual education plan to boost their literacy, numeracy and ICT skills is combined with a work placement to gain labour market skills and access to specific employers and the labour market in general. They exist in 107 local areas and evaluations show promising results for the potential long-term effects on youth employability. In metropolitan areas, 58% of students of the *Écoles de la deuxième chance* finished with a labour market option in training (20%), jobs (17%), apprenticeships (12%), and subsidised employment (9%).

¹¹ Battaglia, M., Une modernisation de l'examen devenue inéluctable. Le Monde, Nr. 22736, p. 9, 16.02.2018

Apprenticeships in secondary education as door opener to the labour-market

Given the high youth unemployment, the 2013 national Education Act aimed to double the number of students combining education with employment by 2020, in form of an apprenticeship, combined with upper secondary, post-secondary, bachelor and masters level qualifications. Not only students, but also enterprises benefit from the implementation of this law: Companies offering apprenticeships receive tax credits and social security exemptions. Whereas these apprenticeships have grown in popularity particularly at the tertiary or upper secondary level, they are much more difficult to access for young people with lower qualifications. The government intends thus to expand the access to apprenticeships at vocational secondary schools and to improve the cooperation with companies and the guidance to apprenticeships for those who are most likely to need them.

2.1.2. Local trends and policies

On the regional level, the share of early school leavers or population with a maximum ISCED 1 educational level, or share of inhabitants with an up to ISCED 1 level in *Haut Rhin*, in the FUA and in m2A is similar to the national average. This is rather different in the city of Mulhouse, where all reached levels of education are much lower (10%). Differences in the education levels of women and men are similar to the gap noticed at national and departmental level (cf. data in the annex).

Inequality in primary and secondary education is to a large extent addressed in the context of urban inclusion policies

The diagnostic report within the *Contrat Unique Agglomération Mulhousienne 2015-2020* (CU) points out that majority of the *French Politique de la Ville* priority neighbourhoods are characterized by similar social fragility that can lead to educational difficulties for young people on all levels of their educational biographies. Often, for these pupils school no longer appears to be a factor for social success. The report also refers to a study indicating that "*pupils who have been schooling in a secondary school located in a sensitive urban area are over-represented in the vocational stream at lycée*"¹², and that on the *baccalaureat* level, schools in these neighbourhoods show lower results than the national average. In the *département Haut-Rhin*, pupils with depriving social background are over-represented (+10 points compared to the national average): More than 43% of the pupils in the *département* have a working-class background, and the city of

¹² Mulhouse Alsace Agglomération et al, p. 98; quote from ONZUS, rapport 2012, les éditions du CIV.

Mulhouse undoubtedly plays an important role in this trend. Inequality is also obvious in the types of *baccalauréat* chosen.¹³

At the same time, according to the CU, Mulhouse has a quite diversified school offer and a serious concern to provide good quality education in an improved built infrastructure, also in deprived neighbourhoods: The city has established numerous bridging classes, music oriented primary and secondary education, bilingual education from nursery school onwards, etc. The educational infrastructure in primary and secondary education consists of 41 public and five private nursery schools, 22 public and five private primary schools, seven public and three private *collèges* and nine public and three private *lycées* (seven with general and five with vocational orientation; just one of them with preparation for the *grandes écoles*).¹⁴ This educational offer benefits from remarkably stable and dynamic educational and pedagogical teams and includes a network of REP/REP+ priority education schools. It is accomplished by a 2nd chance school and a dense network of extra-curricular non-institutional educational actors, such as the socio-cultural centres.

Despite these efforts, the schools' educational success remains – due to "*a young, unstable and mobile population, often in a fragile situation*" (ibid) – weaker than on the national level. Mulhouse is a gateway to the French territory for many immigrants, but social and intercultural inclusion in this 'arrival space' are hindered by precariousness of parents, lacking mastery of the French language, "*community withdrawal*" and parents' distance from school and extracurricular activities. These difficulties concern the entire educational chain and crystallize in two fields: absenteeism at all levels of learning and school drop-outs. Fighting against educational inequality on the primary and secondary levels of education is thus closely linked to the policies addressing urban social segregation within the framework of the *Politique de la Ville*. The CU established in its pillar for social cohesion as *AXIS 2 school retention and educational success* and pursues three objectives: (1) Contribution to the academic success of primary school pupils, (2) support for parents and children in difficulty and (3) contribution to the development of children and their well-being.

Unequal access to the offer of tertiary education

Similar to the primary and secondary education offer, the landscape for tertiary education level is quite diversified, with amongst other three colleges for engineering, six apprenticeship training centres, eight health and social training schools and the *Université d' Haute Alsace* (UHA) as main academic institution, in an important geographical position close to Switzerland and Germany,

¹³ See more detailed at: <https://www.alterpresse68.info/2019/08/29/des-eleves-et-etudiants-alsaciens-aux-prises-avec-des-disparites-sociales-et-des-particularismes-nord-sud-partie-1/>

¹⁴ Source: <https://www.linternaute.com/ville/mulhouse/ville-68224/education>

and also in an interesting commuting distance to the *Université de Strasbourg* (Unistra). Its special focus is on apprenticeships and bi- and tri-national cross-border training/studies. AURM analysed in 2013 the background of the UHA students and concluded that their parents were “*active and of status above the regional average*”. The CSP+ (craftsmen, shopkeepers, company managers, executives, higher intellectual professions) were over represented compared to the regional average. They represented 29% of the parents, compared to 11% of the Alsatian population.

However, at the same time, AURM referred to a study indicating that the *Haut-Rhin* campuses had at that time more students from working-class backgrounds than most other campuses in France and pointed at the importance of the territorial and social networking of higher education in the region – a fact that was also highlighted in the expert interviews. This group of students is however less represented in transfrontalier vocational and academic education, for income and mobility reasons (expert interviews).

2.2. Employment

2.2.1. National and regional trends and policies

In 2021, the unemployment rate of young people without qualifications was in France three times higher than that of young graduates, hence indicating an extremely worrying situation: 15% of 16-29-year olds were unemployed (compared to 12,9% in 2019; Insee 2021). Also, the lack of a diploma is for young people even more of a handicap than for other age groups: 28% of the working population under 30 years of age with only the first school-leaving certificate are looking for a job. When they do work, young people are more and more often, and for longer periods of time, on fixed-term or temporary contracts: among those under 25, more than one in two is on a precarious contract (Brunner & Maurin, 2020). The share of NEET in the population aged 15-29 years old rose sharply with the financial crisis (22,6% in 2008) and until to 2018 (26,4%; Bernard, 2021). In socially deprived neighbourhoods, the situation is even worse: 29% of young people living in the French *Politique de Ville* priority urban neighbourhoods are today NEET, 19% of 20-29-year olds are in poverty, compared to 14.5% for the population as a whole (Charrière & Roger, 2021, see also annex). At present, 51% of the young people who are not NEET are in employment, 43% are unemployed but still in initial education and 6% have returned to education or other forms of training. With the Covid-19 crisis, the share of NEET in metropolitan France increased by 1.1 points in 2020 compared to 2019 (Insee 2021).

Although NEET have in common not to be in employment, Insee points at the fact that their position on the labour market can vary: 47% of the French NEET are unemployed as defined by the *International Labour Office* (ILO), 20% are inactive and would like to work but do not meet the criteria of availability or are in a job search scheme to be considered as unemployed and therefore belong to the unemployment halo. 33% are inactive and declare that they do – for various reasons, such as caring for children, health problems, etc. – not wish to work. Of the young people who are

not NEET, 51% are in employment, 43% are unemployed but still in initial education and 6% have returned to education or other forms of training.

Integrative youth employment policies in France: a chronology from 2008-2021¹⁵

Just after the financial crisis 2008, the French government implemented a *Plan Espoir Banlieue*, providing young people a *contrat d'autonomie* (contract for autonomy) which offers them (in partnership with companies) intensive and personalised support to access stable employment, training leading to qualification and support for start-ups. This instrument was flanked by a *grenelle d'insertion* (roadmap) intending to give a new dynamic to integration policies, in particular the simplification of the contract system. Also, a *Bureau d'aide à l'insertion professionnelle* (BAIP; an agency supporting job search and organising internships) was set up. The *Fonds d'appui aux expérimentations en faveur des jeunes* (funds for experimental programmes supporting young people) financed pilot programmes for the social and professional integration of young people aged 16 to 25.

In 2009, an inter-ministerial committee for youth policies was established, aiming at a cross-cutting transformation of public policies for young people in seven areas: guidance, training, employment, housing, health, citizenship and international mobility. In terms of an emergency plan – a vocational training reform was implemented. The publication of the Green Paper *Reconnaître la valeur de la jeunesse* (Recognising the value of youth), drawn up by the commission on youth policies and chaired by the *High Commissioner for Active Solidarity against Poverty and for Youth*, with 57 proposals to rethink the policy for 16-25 year olds, reinforced awareness for the critical situation. Similar to the development of education policies, numerous policies and instruments were established between 2009 and 2017), such as an action plan for youth that established regional platforms for monitoring dropouts, development of work-linked training and upgrading of apprenticeships, and the *Agence du service civique*, which had to set up a new system of voluntary service for 16 to 25 year olds for missions of collective interest. Also, the eligibility of under 25 years old young people for the *Revenu de solidarité active* (RSA; basic minimum income, replacing youth social benefit) and an income allowance (RCA, paid in addition to support young people's autonomy while searching for employment) for this age-group were established.

This was followed by more thematical interventions, such as a policy for creation of *jobs for the future* and a *Plan priorité jeunesse* (Youth priority plan), including 47 measures on health, housing, living conditions and the place of young people in society. However, the 2017 *Rapport de France Stratégie sur l'insertion professionnelle des jeunes* (French strategic report on the integration of

¹⁵ Source: Direction de l'information légale et administrative/French government; <https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/281366-chronologie-des-politiques-dinsertion-professionnelle-des-jeunes>

youth in the labour market) pointed at *"the lack of mastery of basic skills and peripheral barriers to employment are factors external to the labour market. They hinder young people in their integration process and their access to employment, and are detrimental to their retention in employment"*. It concludes with recommendations to combine social and professional integration to better meet the needs of young people.

Policy creation against youth unemployment challenged the Macron government in 2018/2019 not least in the context of the *gilets jaunes* (yellow vests) *protests*, mobilising members of the working and middle classes from all age groups, professional fields and many regions in France. The instruments established in these years – such as new formula for employment support contracts, for young people who have particular difficulties in finding a job and the launch of a 5-year *Plan d'investissement dans les compétences* (plan for investment in youth skills) – were designed to speed up the inclusion process. At the same time, it became obvious that the failure of just accumulating specific schemes since 2009 led to the need for a more comprehensive approach to prevent and combat poverty among children and young people.

Comprehensive equality oriented policies to tackle this problem have however already been a concern in the professional debate in the early 1980s, when the author of a report on the participation/ inclusion of vulnerable young people pointed at the need for *"guaranteeing professional and social qualifications for all young people and social qualifications for all young people aged 16 to 18"* with an approach, *"that is both structural and conjunctural"*.¹⁶ He recommended apprenticeships and trainings as an extension of compulsory education, indicating that this is *"the only way to ensure that young people are able to continue their education"* and that solutions must be found within a renewed national public education service (alternating work and study units, access to vocational training status, etc.). This approach re-gained importance in present French debates on passing from *"formal right to such training into a right to be claimed for"* (Charrière & Roger, 2021). The debate refers here not only to the psychological damage of dropping out of school, but also to individual poverty risk and public costs of dropping out of school. Both threaten the country's competitiveness and generate significant social costs, far greater than those of the investment in public policies in this area.

Charrière & Roger state that access to the right to qualification is still partly formal, as neither many young people nor their parents are not able to claim for it. Furthermore, pupils leaving initial training without qualifications do not constitute a homogeneous group to which a single response could be provided. They have however in common that after a failure during their initial training,

¹⁶ Schwartz Bertrand, Rapport sur l'insertion professionnelle et sociale des jeunes, La Documentation française, Paris, 1981; quoted in Charrière & Rogers, 2021, p.19.

they may reject not only a return to the school system, but also any contact with a public institution. In terms of a more inclusive society, families should be involved in back-to-school structures, in employment support schemes and in the provision of continuing vocational training. Also, the authors criticise that the focus of public policies and remedial measures is on *"requiring the development of an adapted and innovative offer, developed in a collective manner [...] and through collective mobilisation to build together - including with the young people themselves - appropriate solutions, reversible and secure pathways."* Recent youth employment policy is on this path implementing compulsory training up to the age of 18 and developing alternative strands (e.g. educational or integration workcamps) and a *Parcours d'accompagnement des jeunes vers l'insertion* (Paji; accompanying youth regardless of social and educational status on their way into the labour market) Also, in 2020/2021 support was more individualised (*1 young person, 1 solution* policy and *1 young person, 1 mentor* scheme in priority urban districts (QPV) or rural areas).

Effects of the COVID-19 crisis on young people's employment - national perspective

Generally, on the short term, the economic consequences of the pandemic crisis seem in France to be stronger in the urban and tourist departments. In France, according to the INSEE analysis, job retention measures, such as partial activity or specific measures for young people seem to have mitigated the shock of the health crisis on the French labor market in 2020. INSEE states that *"young people aged 18-24 were less often in employment in 2020 than in 2019, but more were in education. The latter had fewer opportunities to finance their studies through 'odd jobs' or to complete the planned end-of-study internship and international mobility. In 2020, one to four years after graduation, 28% of low school leavers were employed (29% in 2019) compared to 82% of long school leavers, often working from home, and 68% of young people on average."*¹⁷

2.2.2. Local trends and policies

The employment rate (*taux d'actifs*) is similar on the national level, in *Haut Rhin* and in the FUA, but significantly lower in Mulhouse. The unemployment rate in Mulhouse is very high (18,3%), nearly the double of the national average (8%) and much higher than *Haut Rhin* (8,4%) and the Mulhouse FUA (9,4%). This is similar for the unemployment rate of young people 15-24 years. The unemployment rate for young people increased from 2008 to 2013 and though slightly decreasing in 2018, it stayed at a very high level of 38,9%. This rate is calculated in the category *taux d'actifs*, which cover 40% of this population.

¹⁷ Note d'Information n° 21.44, décembre 2021, <https://www.education.gouv.fr/effets-de-la-crise-sanitaire-sur-les-etudes-et-l-emploi-des-jeunes-de-18-24-ans-en-2020-en-france-et-326563>

Effects of the Covid-19 crisis on local employment opportunities

In its 2021 assessment of changes in salaried employment in m2A and South Alsace AURM stated that the Covid-19 crisis has led to an unprecedentedly rapid plunge in labour market activities and jobs, and expected this to continue (AURM 2021a). Three activities have particularly contributed to the decline of the wage bill paid during the year 2020: temporary work and market services, but also industry. However, taking the measure of the effects of the crisis allowed them *"to understand the extent of the shock, which has wiped out, in the Mulhouse conurbation agglomeration and the Haut-Rhin, all the progress made over the last 5 years."*

From the first quarter of 2020, employment collapsed. It recovered during the summer, as the economy emerged from containment, but in the last quarter of 2020, 834 jobs were lost. This was below the level of employment reached in 2015, before the recovery from the financial crisis. Compared to 2019, the number of payroll jobs saw a decline of 4.8%. With an average of 83,031 employees, the year 2020 was a return to the very low levels of employment after the 2008 financial crisis (ibid).

Looking at different sectors of employment,¹⁸ temporary work, a major form of employment in m2A, is the activity most rapidly and most strongly affected – much stronger than in France. Over the year 2020, the temporary workforce fell by 38.5% (10.8% in France). Market services – to give another example – had at least kept pace with national growth in national employment during the recovery. At the same time, all market service activities saw their workforce decline over the year 2020, with hotel and restaurant activities particularly affected. Similarly, telecommunication activities have lost 15% of their workforce. In non-market (or collective) services, the annual average level of employment was in 2020 barely above its 2015 level (significantly higher at the national level; +4 points). Only the construction sector maintained its overall workforce.

In total, there were more than 16,000 fewer employment contracts in 2020 compared to 2019. More than three quarters of these 'missing' contracts were short-term contracts that usually allow older people to remain in employment or young people to access employment. AURM concludes the analysis of contracts signed in 2020 by pointing out that the latter also shows the volatility of contracts signed by young people under 25 years of age and therefore their high degree of precariousness. The consequence was/is a rise in the number of job seekers, in the Mulhouse employment zone¹⁹ it increased by 2,130 people (or +5.6%) between December 2019 and December 2020. Men over 50 years of age are the category for which the increase in the number

¹⁸ This sub-chapter is largely drawn from the AURM analysis, for the whole comprehensive analysis see AURM 2021, Les évolutions de l'emploi salarié dans m2A et le Sud Alsace. Bilan d'une année 2020 hors norme.

¹⁹ No data available for m2A.

of jobseekers is the highest, followed by women in the same age category. The number of contracts of employees aged 50+ by 32%, while the number of contracts signed by 25-year olds fell only by 23%. At the same time, the share of under-25s among CDDC signatories (*Contrats à Durée Déterminée courts* /short term contracts) has increased. A 2020 quarterly evolution of CDDCs also shows a volatility of CDDCs signed by under-25s.

Amongst the barriers that vulnerable young people aged 15-29 years face in the current/crisis related structures of the labour market, mobility also plays an important role in having access to employment or not: Experts interviewed stated that *"as for employment on the outskirts, which is spread out over the valley along this North-South axis, notably vulnerable young people have difficulties accessing jobs. [...] A study on Mulhouse as 'city of the quarter of an hour' indicated that many employment opportunities in m2A are dependent on the car, both for skilled (e.g. the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors) and low-skilled jobs."*

Concerning the offers for young people with low education/NEET there is a (national) programme called *École de la deuxième chance 68, Mulhouse (E2C, Second Chance School)*. The training provided gives meaning to the life project of young people without qualifications. The main condition to get access is having been unemployed for more than a year. E2C it offers tailor-made courses adapted to the needs of each individual aged 17-25 years, in an max. eight-month parkours. The successful project was launched as part of the *Politique de la Ville* in 2021, without any link to the long-term effects of the 2008 crisis or the present Covid-19 crisis. It hasd 47% positive outcomes and jobs obtained in a group of 123 participants, 44% of whom come from priority neighbourhoods of the *Politique de la Ville*²⁰. However, one of the experts interviewed defined the initiative as one of the *"social shock absorbers often developed in France."*

With regard to the effect of the Covid-19 crisis, although an assessment has yet to be made, it seemed to be obvious at the end of 2021 that difficulties such as school drop-out and access to food aid for disadvantaged (not only young) populations have increased. Key actors for both social assistance and motivating/guiding NEET and/or other low educated young people into employment remain the eight socio-cultural centres (cf. interview with the director of CSC Wagner). Similarly, the *Sémaphore* association is effectively involved in the integration of young people into employment (and housing), as one of the are about fifteen associations dealing with precariousness in Mulhouse. In this context it is – according to all experts interviewed – a big challenge to understand the distribution of competences between the different administrative levels: *"The overall offer is improving since approximately 10 years, but its structure and the criteria for the involved actors' responsibilities are unclear for many, both for the actors and the beneficiaries*

²⁰ Source: <http://www.e2c68.fr/>

of the aid. [...] Who determines the level of major difficulty for a young person in difficulty in order to know who to contact? There are various organisations that can provide information and others that provide funding and financial aid. Determining the right scale is a constant concern." A 2022 analysis of the Mulhouse *Maison de l'emploi* (local job centre) goes even a bit further: "*What we find is that beneficiaries are often lost when faced with the many existing schemes and the different actors who work side by side, without consulting each other. Mass reception no longer works, we need to develop the "going towards" people, while building a common language and a link between the different structures.*"²¹

The local debate evolves thus around the notion of a one-stop shop or very targeted services: Despite most of the employment schemes for disadvantaged young people being put in practice with partners in the *Politique de la Ville* priority neighbourhoods, few schemes apply to young people from disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the strict sense of the word. Schemes such as the Mulhouse *Cité Educative*²² try however to ensure that young people from QPV have access to better training, but it is still too early to evaluate their role/success. In order to strengthen access to employment and vocational training for the inhabitants of QPV, also a *Cité de l'emploi*²³ has been established in Mulhouse at the end of 2021. Its approach is to bring together all the players in a given area to pool their tools, methods and resources to provide better support and identification of residents of the QPVs in order to offer them the follow-up they really need. In m2A, two coordinators take stock of all the partners' tools, of the measures applied for the recent *Plan de Relance* (Recovery Plan), in order to make them available in an easy-to-use way for all.

Illectronism as barrier to youth employment²⁴

Analysing both needs for the improvement of digitalisation and lessons learnt during the Covid-19 crisis, AURM identified a digital gap concerning young people's competence in computer techniques and the use of all digital resources. AURM expects 14,000 Mulhouse residents to be potentially concerned by *illelectronism*, in very different situations and in different urban contexts. The challenge – to be dealt with by the municipality in cooperation with AURM and public and NGO educational actors – is both to develop a digital fragility index for the Mulhouse population and to raise awareness of the societal and economic challenges of digital technology and

21 Source: <https://www.mplusinfo.fr/cite-de-lemploi-de-mulhouse-simplifier-et-lever-les-freins-a-lemploi-mulhouse/>

22 Established in 2021 in the Les Coteaux neighbourhood, with a share 44,7 % of population younger than 25 years; see <https://www.citeseducatives.fr/cite/cite-educative-de-mulhouse>

23 See <https://www.mef-mulhouse.fr/actions/cite-de-l-emploi.html>

24 Source for this paragraph: AURM/Jennifer Keith (2022) and expert interview 2021.

familiarising residents with digital technology. The educational system shall in this context cooperate (introduction to digitalisation an early age, warning about the risks of digital technology and information about solutions, e.g. in the Citizen Participation Agency's meetings). A relevant share of young people living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods is in fact *computer illiterate*: Whereas they usually do appear to be comfortable using certain tools to access popular APPs, active steps such as filling in an online form or answering a public or employer's questionnaire can be much more difficult for some. These young people aged 18 to 29 make up approximately a quarter of the public who consults local association because of having difficulties in using digital tools/accessing digital information. *Illectronism* is also of concern in the field of equal digital participation, particularly in the context of the Citizen Participation charter. Two reasons for the city of Mulhouse to set up a working group to build better networks against *illelectronism*.²⁵

The *Fonderie*, a former industrial site for mechanics, is becoming a sort of digital campus of the future of industry (://www.campus-fonderie.uha.fr/) with, in particular, a digital school *Ecole 42*, a computer science school accessible without a diploma requirement.

INSEE consideration of consequences of the crisis in the Haut-Rhin

Despite the many activity support schemes put in place by the government and despite the potential difficulties in making positive acts of job search, between the 4th quarter of 2019 and the 4^e quarter of 2020, the number of people registered with the job center (*Pôle Emploi*) increased by 5% in the *Grand Est* region as well as at the mainland level. At the same time, the *Grand Est* will have 155,000 households receiving an active solidarity income (*Revenu de solidarité active, RSA*) in December 2020, i.e. 6% more than a year earlier (compared to 8% at national level). In this respect, the Haut-Rhin stands out from the other departments in the region by the size of the increase observed (+13%).

25 (<https://mulhousecestvous.fr/blog/mulhouse-se-reinvente>)

2.3. Housing

Housing policies are a key instrument to promote or hinder equality and participation in all spheres of life. They may provide a wide range of instruments to improve equality and participation, such as allowing access to decent shelter, providing a stock structure responding to the diversity of the population and allocation policies that prevent housing discrimination. In terms of gender sensitive equal participation and spatial planning, housing policies may have an effect on environmental (e-)quality, efficient use of scarce resources, energy poverty and type and extent of commuting.

2.3.1. National and regional trends and policies

As for the individual household, in a snapshot on the cross-country perspective on France's housing-related indicators and policy settings, the OECD states that households' tenure choices depend mainly on demographics and/or socio-economic factors, as well as on policies related to public promotion of housing, housing taxation and rental regulations: Home-ownership in France is considered to be lower than OECD average, and after having grown at a fast rate in the early 2000s, real house prices and housing investment started to slow down after the Global Financial Crisis in 2007/2008. The housing investment rate has however been relatively stable throughout the years and ranked above the OECD average in recent years. Generally, housing constitutes single household's largest financial asset. The related ratio of outstanding household mortgage claims to GDP in France is close to average by international comparison (OECD 2021).²⁶

With – compared with other European countries – a very high level of new construction, the housing policies in France address the challenge of covering a wide range of products for a large share of low and middle-income households: They include financial subsidies and fiscal instruments provided for social rental housing and first-time buyers, fiscal mechanisms for private "buy to let" projects and a general housing allowance scheme for tenants, helping both private and social tenants. Some rules can be adjusted according to the local market, especially in more expensive zones and tense markets or in deprived rural and urban areas.²⁷ Social rental housing (*habitation à loyer modéré*, HLM) is provided by a network of social housing organizations (offices and non-profit private companies).²⁸

26 There are hardly any gender sensitive data in this field. Research in Potsdam/Germany has shown considerable gender differences in home ownership and access to rent contracts, both affecting participation, income and housing safety of women (Autonomes Frauenzentrum Potsdam e..V. (eds.), 2019)

27 French overseas territories, which are explicitly also target areas of these policies are not relevant for this report.

28 Source: <https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/politiques/accesion-proprete-vente-et-fiscalite-immobilier>

The French housing market theoretically offers the possibility of following a 'classical housing ladder', starting from private renting (small flat for young households) to social renting (larger flat for families) and then up to owner occupation in family houses. This is just a model, which does – as the supply of each product may vary according to the local housing market – not cover all kinds of demand. In balanced markets, with a wide supply of houses or land for construction, first time buyers may enter the housing market rather young, without going through the various levels of the rental sector. On the contrary, on tense and expensive markets, rental housing is the strongest housing market sector. With a national average of 58% of owner occupiers in 2018, the ratio varies from 80% in rural areas and small towns to 30% in middle and large size towns. These national average figures correspond to data concerning Mulhouse where 33% of the households are owner occupiers, 40% are private tenants and 27% social tenants. Home ownership is more developed in houses than in flats. Logically, there are more owners in the agglomeration (m2A) with a rate of owner occupiers of 54%, while in the Grand Est Region as a whole, the figure of owner occupation is 59%. The share of owner occupiers is thus linked to the urban structure: The more flats, the more tenants. The more houses, the more owner-occupiers. The housing stock of Mulhouse consists of 86% of flats and 14% houses, while the balance of the FUA includes 39% flats and 61% houses.

In the international perspective, France is often qualified as the archetype of a centralized state, in opposition to countries organized on a federal basis. Also, the French debate on regional disparities has for a long time been characterised by the contrast between metropolitan areas and periphery. The socio-economic inequalities between the regions on the one hand and the lack of visibility of government action in the regions on the other hand have been a major cause of concern. Le Bras/Warnant (2020) state that *"a closer look at these disparities paints the picture of a 'fragmented' France, in which a centralist policy is not a proven means in the fight against inequality"*. Also, according to Leron (2021), the described spatial contrasts went along with social disparities and have become aggravated and further differentiated during the last decade: France has become a country that shows persistent gaps in individual opportunities between territories and strong social fracture lines, and thus a so called *"archipelago society"* (ibid, p. 6; Fourquet 2019). However, the vision of France as a centralized country needs to be updated in order to consider a strong and regular empowerment of local powers, through a regular set of laws during the last 30 years. The following examples show how for the last 30 years de-concentration and decentralization policies have been combined:

- Housing policies are decided within a national legal and fiscal framework, with a special emphasis on social inclusion and social mix including e.g. an “enforceable right to housing” (*droit au logement opposable*, DALO²⁹).
- On the level of housing policy instruments, the national programme for urban renewal (*Programme National de Renouvellement Urbain*, PNRU) steered by the state agency for urban renewal (*Agence Nationale pour le Renouvellement Urbain*, ANRU³⁰) is an example of a national programme for urban and housing inclusion. It is organized and monitored by the local authorities and their partners and covers a wide range of action: new supply of housing, mixing tenures and social groups in areas which were mainly devoted to shelter low-income households.
- The implementation of national rules and processes can be transferred from the national budget to local authorities which will manage it at departmental or intercommunal level: They may receive delegation from the Ministry of Housing for allocating grants and aids for improving private and social housing, and for financing social rental units.

As they are monitored, for the last twenty years, at the local level, both on the departmental level (*département*, NUTS3) and intercommunal entities (*Établissement public de coopération intercommunale*, EPCI), housing policies are decentralized: The Local Housing Programme (*Programme local de l’habitat*, PLH) is elaborated at the intercommunal level, most of the time covering the new EPCI³¹ or sometimes a wider area (e.g. a FUA). The PLH must be established in a consistent manner with other local plans, such as the General Master Plan (ScOT³²) and the Local Urban Development Plan (*Plan local d’urbanisme*, PLU³³). While communes and the communal cooperation bodies (EPCI) are competent for planning land use and new construction, the department is a competent authority to implement the various policies for social aspects of housing, including policies for specific populations (young, elderly, homeless, migrants, gypsies &

29 For more information on the policy, see: <https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F18005>

30 The Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine (ANRU, National Agency for Urban Renewal, <https://www.anru.fr/>) is a public establishment of an industrial and commercial nature created by Article 10 of the Orientation and Programming Law for the City and Urban Renewal of 1 August 2003, implemented in order to ensure the implementation and financing of the national urban renewal programme (PNRU).

31 1253 EPCI gather the numerous municipalities in France, a way of modernizing local management without compulsory merging of communes

32 <https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/scot-projet-strategique-partage-lamenagement-dun-territoire>

33 PLU Plan local d’urbanisme, provides all rules for construction and land use on a specific area

travellers). They enact a plan for housing vulnerable groups (PDAHLPD³⁴) and other documents for monitoring subsidies and grants in cooperation with the municipalities, EPCI and the State local representative (prefect).

Average housing prices in France have increased incessantly since 2000, on all markets, much more than the average income (CGEDD, Friggitt 2021). In the timeline and market development, the global financial crisis had hardly any impact on the French housing market, apart from a slowdown of owner-occupation between 2008 and 2020. The housing affordability situation in the home ownership sector has been decreasing both in middle and large cities, leading to a significant decrease on the figures of new construction of individual houses for owner occupier, especially for first time buyers. On the other hand, thanks to a strong set of insurances and guarantee rules for home buyers, especially suited for first-time buyer and low-income borrowers, eviction and seizure of property by banks is rare in France.

The increase of prices was strong for existing homes, and the new supply (1% to 1,5% of the existing stock) is always adjusting its prices to the local market. As the cost of construction didn't change much until 2020, the increase of price is a windfall for the seller of the land. In the private rental sector, rental prices have increased as well, albeit at a slower pace than prices. For young households who want to buy a home, higher house prices constitute a barrier. This particularly applies to young adults with a middle or lower middle income if they cannot rely on substantial intergenerational transfers or a plot of land. Their strategy might be to choose a remote location where land is cheaper. The main aid for home buying is a zero interest loan (*Prêt à taux zero*, PTZ) covering 20% (or more) of the cost, which need to be associated with a commercial loans and some equities (5 to 10%) . This loan is granted to first-time buyers, with low and middle-income, in urban areas for buying mainly new construction: This loan was used 671 times in 2018 in *Haut Rhin*, of which 189 in the Mulhouse metropole (m2A), from the total number applied 75 households with low income (below 2300 €, 2*SMIC³⁵) and 83 households younger than 30 years.³⁶

34 PDALPD Plan départemental pour l'accès au logement et l'hébergement des personnes en difficulté

35 SMIC salaire minimum inter-professionnel garanti minimal monthly wage for a full-time work

36 Source: Observatoire Crédit Logement CSA, <https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/politiques/accesion-proprieete-vente-et-fiscalite-limmobilier>

A factor of both quality improvement and equal access to housing for the private rental sector is a fiscal scheme³⁷ which enables private households to invest in rental home (buy to let). This produces between 30,000 to 50,000 dwellings a year, with rents situated above social rental housing (10 €/m² in Mulhouse, 2021). This type of new building has to meet environmental standards for the construction. It is targeted towards middle income tenants, but contributes to increase the average quality of private rental supply. The security for tenants is based on a three years contracts, six years if the landlord is not a physical investor. There is no limit to tenancy in the social rental sector, with expectation if the income of the tenant increases strongly – which is a very rare situation. Rent setting at the beginning of the contract is in the private sector free. In contrast, the yearly rent increase is tied to a specific index for rent, close to the inflation rate (*Indice de Référence des Loyers*, IRL).

Private and social rental sector tenants may be eligible for a rental housing allowance. The requirements for getting this allowance are linked with income and size of the households, and covering all territories for 3,2 million private tenants, 2,5 million social tenants. 40 % of all tenants are eligible, including students and elderly in senior homes and residencies, for a total cost of € 18 billion (2020). In the social rental sector, with a total of rent and charges of € 24 billion, housing allowances close to € 7 billion cover 30% of the household's expenses.³⁸ However, the *Agence nouvelle des solidarités actives* and the French Caritas foundation state that *"according to INSEE, a quarter of homeless people in France are aged between 18 and 29 in France. DREES statistics allow us to estimate the share of young people aged 18 to 25 who, because of their age, do not have access to the RSA. They represent approximately 7% of the total number of eligible people in general (emergency and integration), i.e. over 7,000 people. Coming from a difficult family environment, these young people often combine psychological vulnerabilities, in part with addictions. With regular wages, and excluded from the active solidarity income, their access to housing is compromised by their lack of stable income."* (ibid, 2017).

2.3.2. Local trends and policies

Average housing price over average income has strongly increased for the last ten years in France. The trend should be the same if measured at local level, in spite of the fact that no precise data are available. Since the GFC 2008, a significant decrease of first buyers can be estimated through the decrease of production of individual houses and a lower mobility among social housing tenants. But this would need a more in-depth analysis at the level of the FUA than the framework

³⁷ Provided since 1984 under various names, for developing private rental sector the fiscal scheme "Pinel-Duflot" provides a 18% tax refund for letting minimum 9 years at controlled rents. <https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F10871>

³⁸ Source: Les HLM en Chiffres USH Repères n°88 édition 2021, <https://www.union-habitat.org/les-hlm-en-chiffres>

of this report allowed. The local housing programme (*Programme local de l'habitat Mulhouse Alsace Agglomération*, PLH) that provides many data about rents and prices, shows – compared with the other urban housing markets in Alsace – rather low prices and rents.

The share of social rental housing is higher in Mulhouse than in the FUA or department which is linked with the historical and economic growth of the town. Mulhouse has an old tradition of a strong supply of social rental housing, starting with various initiatives of local industrialists at the end of the XIX century. The official repertory of social housing supply, which is more accurate than the data from the general census, indicates in Mulhouse 13,130 social rental housing units, a share above 27% of the principal homes housing stock. Finally, Mulhouse has a very high rate of vacant homes (above 15%), which indicates a poor level of private owners' reinvestment in existing stock.

Social housing

In the French social rental sector, thanks to a unique central registry, the social demand and supply of social rented homes can be easily assessed at the local level: The Mulhouse housing stock includes 13,130 social rental homes, there were 3,775 requests pending of social housing (end 2020) and 1,532 allocations of housing units during the year 2020. The average length of wait for a social home is eight months. The demand is very high for the smallest flats (one and two rooms), as they are the cheapest and address households in need, especially young people/starter households. 60% of households requesting a social home in Mulhouse are one- or two-people's households. The 'rate of tension of social demand' for housing is 2,4 in Mulhouse and 2,72 in the m2A, close to the *Haut Rhin* average. This is much lower than in Alsace (3,87) and at the average in France (4,0).³⁹

The provision of HLM/social rental housing in Mulhouse is organized as follows: Four main organizations provide more than 11,640 units and ten smaller organizations provide 1,489 units. To give an example of the stock and organisational dimension, *Mulhouse Habitat Agglomération – m2A* forms part of the Société anonyme de coordination Rhénalia, with 32,000 housing units in 135 municipalities. In Mulhouse, it owns a stock of 10,000 dwellings of which less than 1,000 are individual, essentially located in the city of Mulhouse and with two thirds of its property in target areas of the *Politique de la Ville*. Like for most social housing partners in France, the financial crisis of 2008 had no significant impact on their economic situation and stock development. The smaller companies and organizations are often specialized for sheltering very low-income households or people with special needs like foreign workers and fragile persons. They provide social services and training connected with housing. Such small private (not for profit) organizations are more suitable for small scale actions for very low-income people in need of shelter than large social

³⁹ Source : <https://www.demande-logement-social.gouv.fr/index>

housing companies; but they must work together as social housing companies have more financial resources and a wide stock of homes for rehousing homeless after a time of adaptation and/or social reinsertion.⁴⁰

An internationally known example for an urban renewal intervention in the social housing stock is the *Cité Manifeste* in the urban and symbolic context of the old *Cité Ouvrière*, which is the former industrial city of Mulhouse. *Cité Manifeste*, a twenty-first century social housing experiment designed by five renowned architectural teams was built as an extension to *Cité Ouvrière*, a nineteenth-century industrial housing scheme for textile factory workers. On a so far very small scale, Mulhouse also developed self-promotion or participatory housing, that is also in France considered as a 'third way of housing', between public social housing and private development. An example is the Eco-Habitat INTERSEL, addressing particularly tenants with moderate incomes, with inexpensive social housing apartments.

Very social housing

There is a number of specific examples for social housing policies in Mulhouse and the FUA of Mulhouse, accommodating the vulnerable and those in most extreme housing need (those eligible for very social housing in France, because of low income ceilings and low rents).⁴¹

- Programme local de l'habitat Mulhouse Alsace agglomération (PLH m2A)

The Mulhouse Alsace Agglomeration's local housing programme (PLH) is the main reference document for social housing. It provides an inventory of the situation and the main guidelines and programming of actions in terms of housing policy, on the scale of all the 39 communes of Mulhouse Alsace Agglomeration (m2A; 275,000 inhabitants). These guidelines ensure a balanced supply of housing in the area, in terms of location, type of housing, tenure, income from 2020 until 2025. The diagnosis (September 2019) scrutinizes all data both from the supply side (housing stock, structure and prices) and from the demand side (households). Among the categories studied, special focuses are provided regarding youth (under 15 years), students⁴², seniors (60+) and gypsies & travellers (*gens du voyage*). A special attention is given to the income of the inhabitants, especially people at risk of poverty, however – with exception of single parent ship - neglecting gender difference and possible effects on the housing situation. In the agglomeration,

⁴⁰ See <https://www.habitat-humanisme.org/>

⁴¹ For Very Social Housing in France, see Scanlon/Whitehead/Fernández Arrigoitia (2014)

⁴² Mulhouse and Colmar saw an increase of student numbers during the last years. Mulhouse had 8,000 students in 2012, and 10,000 in 2017 (+25 %), after a decade of decreasing numbers.

Mulhouse concentrates a higher number of households with low income and/or with precarious employment.

The diagnostic, orientation document and the plan for action for the PLH (AURM 2019) present four main orientations and 23 different actions to be planned for 2020-2025. One action includes *"to deal with an ageing population while keeping attractiveness for young people and households"*. Another task is to improve the *"condition of accommodation for people in need"*, accelerating the move towards ordinary housing. Mulhouse takes thus part in the national program 'Housing first' (*Logement d'abord*), which is supposed to provide an accelerated access for homeless to autonomous ordinary housing, instead of using different forms of social hostel (dormitory, social shelter etc).⁴³ The latter has however been criticised for being mainly implemented in innovative and experimental projects on a small scale, and only for specific groups. Other specific actions initiated in the Mulhouse area are

- "Housing without money", providing a guarantee fund for
 - access to housing: financing equipment (washing machine etc),
 - maintenance of housing (financing a fraction of the rent or charges), and
 - for people under 25 and people who are at the end of the period of eligibility for governmental social support of young people,
 - and a digital platform and management by the Mulhouse municipal social action centre (CCAS).
- Action Plan "Housing and Shelter for Vulnerable Populations" (*Plan d'action pour le logement et l'hébergement des personnes défavorisées* 2018-2023, PDALHPD Haut Rhin):

The plan pursues five axes and 12 actions and lists the 13 categories of people in need regarding housing. They are listed according to the law (including the law granting the enforceable right to housing DALO), with special mention of young people at the age of 18-25 years among other categories. Special attention is given to 'roaming young people' (*jeunes en errance*) and 'early leavers from education' (*en décrochage scolaire*), through local associations in link with social services in charge of families.

Examples for the development of specific homes and assistance for organizing co-renting are:

- *Aleos*, an association which used to work mainly for foreign workers and today targets its action and housing product development towards all public with special social needs.

⁴³ <https://www.haut-rhin.gouv.fr/Politiques-publiques/Solidarite-hebergement-logement-et-populations-vulnerables/LOGEMENT-D-ABORD>. See also: Agence nouvelle des solidarités actives, 2017.

- *La boussole des jeunes*, an online “compass for the youth”, providing quick access to information about housing, training and employment in the *Haut Rhin* area.⁴⁴
- *Croire en son avenir – CESA (Believe in your future)*, a programme developed in *Haut Rhin* by the association APPUIS⁴⁵. This association covers a wide range of social action for youngsters, minor and above 18. After having stayed for a short period in APPUIS’ accommodation centre (*Centre d’hébergement et de réinsertion sociale*, 150 units, 50% them dedicated to mothers with babies), the young people are individually oriented towards autonomous housing/co-renting.
- *SOLIBAIL*, managed by a ‘real estate agency with social purpose’ (*Agence immobilière à vocation sociale – AIVS*), provides a rental stock of 450 units, scattered in the private and social housing stock. As of February 2017, the ‘Affordable rent’ (*Louer abordable*) scheme provides based on an agreement with the National Agency for Housing (*Agence nationale de l’habitat ANAH*) a tax rebate to landlords who let at affordable rent to households with low and middle income. Landlords and tenants benefit from financial guarantees for a secure rental management, during the first 3 years of the lease also in case of rental arrears. AIVS cares for the collection of the Personal Housing Assistance (APL), insurance for rental deterioration in return for an additional contribution. Here too, APPUIS provides social services for helping tenants to settle in an autonomous life.
- *Habitat & Humanisme (H&H)*, created in Lyon in 1985 by Bernard Devert, comprises an umbrella association for local associations in 95 departments and a foundation. H&H works to a large extent with voluntary supporters and is rooted in a resistance movement, when first ‘ghetto districts’ (*banlieues en crise*) appeared on the outskirts of large cities. Amongst its 9500 flats provided in France, H&H established with its Alsace Sud association the project *Runtz-Filature* in Franklin district in Mulhouse, with ten housing units for intergenerational use. H&H housing offer includes education, training and search for employment. The social and generational mix objective is co-living of isolated elderly people, young people in precarious situations, single mothers with children, and families. Also, H&H is the pioneer of solidarity savings in France.

Altogether the housing situation in Mulhouse can be considered to be not as tense as in similar cities with a high level of social housing supply, but the high rate of unemployment and high rate of people at risk of poverty put a permanent pressure on the social housing sector. Also, some of the experts interviewed pointed at a deficit of differentiated forms of very social housing meeting the needs young people, and especially those of single parents (in the majority women, usually in

⁴⁴ <https://boussole.jeunes.gouv.fr/>

⁴⁵ <https://www.association-appuis.fr/>

a weaker economic position than single fathers). Access to the social and very social housing doesn't seem to be totally equal: In one of the interviews, the rehousing of people in difficulty during the winter was mentioned as a specific barrier. Focussing on young people, a social housing neighbourhood coordination expert stated that *"a striking phenomenon is the increasing demand for housing from young people without a home, who are sometimes thrown out of their family home. [...] These situations seem to indicate situations of growing tension within family environments."*

According to several of the experts interviewed, language often constitutes another barrier: Alongside the traditionally immigrating North African populations, and the new generations who have become Alsatians, there is a wide variety of origins in the social housing stock, from sub-Saharan Africa to the entire Balkan area or further afield. In order to better manage communications to and with all applicants and tenants, *m2A Habitat*, the largest local social housing provider, is testing a new application that allows communication in about forty languages and to manage reading for different categories of visually impaired people.

In terms of structural inequality, the Mulhouse social housing stock poses challenges in two fields of action: First, small dwellings (T1, one room) are in high demand, in a social housing stock made up of two thirds T3 and T4 (3 and 4 rooms). Second, the demolition of 600 dwellings in the context of urban renewal has to be compensated, and a particular axis of development concerns – without perceptible focus on young people – the creation of housing adapted to disabled people.

Effects of the Covid-19 crisis

In housing, the experts agreed that the health crisis has a discernible impact on intra-household relations. Intra-family violence increased significantly during and after the confinement, leading to an increased demand for independent housing. Similarly, neighbourhood disturbances with a psychiatric connotation increased during and after the confinement, requiring the local services (e.g. the five agencies spread throughout the estate of the biggest social housing provider *m2A Habitat*) to be very vigilant in resolving occasional conflicts. Also, occasional socio-economic tensions can be observed in the development of undue occupation of common areas for illicit activities.⁴⁶

On the other hand, the interviews made clear that the question of household solvency during the health crisis did not arise. Although certain categories of employees suffered a slowdown in their activity, the compensation measures put in place seem to have had a cushioning effect on the crisis; the same is true for populations whose very modest incomes are largely based on transfer income. These have remained stable, thanks to the social and housing aid, managed by both the

⁴⁶ See <https://www.lalsace.fr/faits-divers-justice/2021/12/18/trafic-de-droque-aux-coteaux>

département and the Family Allowance Funds. The fear of a sharp rise in unpaid rent, expressed by social housing organisations in April 2020, has thus proved to be unjustified. Concluding, the Covid-19 crisis shows rather *"an accentuating effect on trends of inequality that already existed before, particularly a strong divide between e.g. the Wolf Wagner district, a target area of the Politique de la Ville, and the rest of the agglomeration"* than specific effects. As in these areas with a generally disadvantaged population, 38% of young people are classified as 'NEET' (cf. statistical annex), a reinforcing effect on their inequality is to be expected.

2.4. Gender Equality

Gender remains the strongest driver of inequality in Europe, intersectional with other characteristics of inequality and/or discrimination, such as class, ethnicity (racial discrimination), sexual identity or orientation, or living with a handicap. Gender related discrimination and policies against it become also effective in a cross-sectional manner, in all fields of action looked at in UPLIFT. Gender inequality persists by the *Doing Gender* of actors, in policies and of individuals who are – in terms of the UPLIFT research – responsible for youth policies and their implementation. The concept of *Doing Gender* was developed by Candace West and Don Zimmermann in 1987, and is rooted in feminist interaction-theoretical sociology. According to them, the production of gender belonging and gender identity is an everyday practice and as such a hardly avoidable process. Later gender studies (cf. Butler 1991, Gildemeister 2010, Lorber 1995, Wetterer 2010) refer to their concept when discussing the social construction and the performative production of gender. Still today, their approach is helpful to overcome biologist positions and to follow their distinction between the categories *sex* (classification of body gender at birth based on socially determined biological characteristics), *sex category* (social attribution of gender to 'male' and 'female' as a result of the application of these characteristics) and *gender* (ability of the individual to act in such a way that his/her own actions/appearance correspond to the social gender attribution made) (cf. West/Zimmermann 1987: 131pp), which Gildemeister described later as *"intersubjective validation in interaction processes through behaviour and action appropriate to the situation"* (2010: 138), which in turn corresponds to the sex category adopted. Applying this approach to the here used data on gender (in-)equality in the educational field, the access to employment and gender differentiation within the overall group of the NEET leads to the consideration that there is still need for more reflection of gender difference and a respective development of policies to reach gender equal participation of disadvantaged young people.

Although the project's framework did not allow for an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness and structural linking of the instruments for gender equality on the national, regional and local level in France, the desk-top research led to some important insights on need for action concerning NEET. This chapter therefore at least provides some pointers concerning gender equality of young people in France, and notable the NEET amongst them, to be further explored in policy design.

However, it lacks – due to data and practice in this field being difficult to access with the given resources, notably on the local level – a sub-chapter on gender and housing.

2.4.1. National and regional trends and policies

France's gender equality score has according to the European Institute for Gender Equality (since 2010 increased by 7.6 points (EIGE; reference in the following to the EIGE report for France, 2020). It ranks today with 75.1 out of 100 points 3rd in the EU on the *Gender Equality Index*. Making slightly faster progress towards gender equality than other Member States, it has improved its position by four places since 2010. In this comparative analysis, France's highest scores are in the domains of health (87.4 points) and money (87.0 points). Since 2010, France's scores have improved in all domains, with the biggest improvements in the domains of power (+ 27.4 points), knowledge (+ 4.3 points) and money (+ 3.4 points).

The EIGE index provides no explanation, whether and to what extent this may result from post financial crisis instruments to promote gender equality. It would also need further investigation to consider how far France's low scores in the domains of knowledge and time (66.3 points and 67.3 points, respectively) and France's low ranking in the domain of work (16th in the EU), result amongst other from the high unemployment rates of young people and the share of NEET.

Fields of action within which EIGE identifies need for improvement are care work, the gender pay gap and the gender pension gap: More women than men in France do cooking and house-work and intergenerational care or care for people with disabilities (min. 1 hour/day), and the gender gap in care activities is among the highest in the EU. Also, women continue to earn less than men. In couples with children, women earn 30 % less than men, and in couples without children women earn 26 % less than men. Comparing the mean monthly earnings of women and men (16 +), EIGE data indicate that women earned in 2014 app. 500 € less than men, and that in mean monthly earnings the pay gap is wider among people aged 50–64 (30 %). Subsequently, the gender gap in old age pension is also wide, with app. 670 € (2018). The 2021 edition of the French government's gender equality report *Chiffres-Clés 2021 : Vers l'égalité réelle entre les femmes et les hommes* indicates a slow narrowing of the pay gap in the private sector from 17,6% in 2015 to 16,8% in 2018, and from 13,4% in 2015 to 12,4% in 2017 in the public sector. It also indicates that single parents, of whom 82 % are in France women, earn significantly less, live 2.5 times more below the poverty line and are stronger represented in urban priority neighbourhoods.

According to the OECD *Better Life Index*, the labour force participation rate of women aged 25-54 is higher than the average of member countries, and 78% of these working women work full-time. However, the *Chiffres-Clés 2021* put such a statement into perspective, indicating that 86.6% of the nursing staff, 77.7% of the intermediate health and social work professions, 70% of the maintenance workers and 97.7% of the home helpers and 66.2% of school teachers, primary school teachers and equivalent are women. Given this strong imbalance, access to the labour

market for mothers of young children and large families could according to the *Better Life Index* be improved. This would require a fairer distribution of childcare between parents: If fathers were to take more care of their children at birth, it would make it easier for mothers to return to work. Whereas before, men were only entitled to 11 days of parental leave, a reform in 2014 established that one parent (usually the mother) can claim this allowance for two and a half years, while the other parent (usually the father) can claim the remaining six months. However, this allowance also encourages young mothers working part-time on a low wage to stop working, which may have a negative effect on their future employment.⁴⁷ This may be considered a serious risk for women NEET.

Gender equality: legal and policy framework

Historically, equality is one of the fundamental ideals underpinning the French Constitution, where it was introduced in the Preamble in 1946 and 1958, referring to the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen). From a more recent perspective, French gender equality legislation and policies have for more than two decades been criticised to be at the same time strong in and reduced to gender equality legislation concerning employment and women's professional development, with a strong child care structure to promote women's employment. EIGE published in 2019 a comprehensive summary of French gender equality laws policies since the early 1970s, which is the core source of the following paragraph of this chapter.⁴⁸ The report considers the law on equal pay in 1972 as key action and legal basis for gender equality policies in France, and points on several laws following until 2014.

An important incentive to strengthen domestic gender equality policy was the establishing of a Secretary of State for Women's Rights and Equality in the Workplace in 2000. After the 2012 elections, increased commitment to gender equality led to the re-establishment of an independent Women's Rights Ministry, which had been shut down in the early 1990s. A key instrument established in this phase was the compulsory adoption of a gender equality action plan by each ministry, as well as the appointment of gender equality officers in each policy area, with reporting obligation to the Minister for Women's Rights. However, the government has downgraded the responsibility level for promoting gender equality to that of a State Secretary.

Looking back at the overall development, it is important to note that from 2001 onwards, a summary of gender equality policies was included in the *Loi d'orientation de la loi de finance* (LOLF), which was transformed in 2010 into a comprehensive transversal policy document on gender equality, also appended to the LOLF. This obliged the government to present fiscal

47 Source: OECD Better Life Index 2020, <https://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/fr/countries/france-fr/>

48 Source: <https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/countries/france>

information in line with the objectives of public policies and in addition, the annexes of the government's draft Budget Act included now an annual performance report on the actions of *Programme 137*, which targets gender equality policies, as well as an annual 'Integrated policy document' that summarises the actions of inter-ministry policies to contribute to gender equality.

In this context, according to EIGE since 2012 a gender equality policy has been actively pursued by the government and by local and regional authorities. Although the French legislative and policy framework on gender equality since developed increasingly complex measures in the areas of reproductive rights, work, social protection, pensions, violence against women, access to decision-making and fighting gender-based discrimination, the key act on equality between women and men, *LOI n° 2014-873 du 4 août 2014 pour l'égalité réelle entre les femmes et les hommes* (Law of 4 August 2014) was only implemented in 2014. This law is considered to have brought an important change in the French legislative framework for gender equality by promoting an '*integrated and transversal approach to gender equality*'. It provides precise role definitions in the governance of gender equality, on the level of national, regional and local authorities.

Despite Gender Mainstreaming developed in France like in other European countries to promote gender equality in society and public policy from the late 1990s, the Ministry of Labour established only in 2019 a national *Indice de l'égalité* (Gender Equality Index) to measure and explicitly fight the gender pay gap and other gender-related inequalities at work.

Key issues of the recent gender equality debates in France are the implementation of the *Parité* in politics as well as in leadership in professional fields,⁴⁹ the fight against sexual harassment and more public attention for the rights and discrimination of LGBT+. After the 2017 elections, the *La République En Marche*⁵⁰ movement organized a citizen consultation *Pour une égalité réelle entre les femmes et les hommes* (For real equality between women and men) that addressed a broad range of gender equality issues. The five main proposal issuing from the citizen consultation (with app. 35,000 participants, of them 5,000 non-members of the movement and 48% men) were (1) Merge maternity and paternity leave into a common childcare leave to be shared by both parents, (2) Create a right to information on the salaries of the opposite sex in a job of equal responsibility in the company, (3) Strengthen the role of the national education system in the fight against gender inequality, (4) Establish strict parity in all positions of responsibility and (5) Allow all

49 For a first reflection of the debates on Parité see e. g.: Bereni, L. & Lépinard, E. (2004) Les femmes ne sont pas une catégorie". Les stratégies de légitimation de la parité en France », *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 54 (1), 2004, S. 71–98.

50 La République en Marche refers to a centre-left, pro-European movement founded in 2016 that contributed significantly to the success of E. Macron in the 2017 election and which achieved an absolute majority (308 out of 577 seats).

married or civil union couples to maintain their taxation at the individual rather than the household level.⁵¹

Structural framework - governance of gender equality

Since 2017, the responsibility for gender equality is attached to the Prime Minister's office, with a Secretary of State position. His/her work is, in continuation of equality oriented governmental action since the 1990s, supported through inter-ministerial cooperation.

The central administration unit and government body in charge of gender equality and gender mainstreaming is the *Service des droits des femmes et de l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes* (SDFE, Service for Women's Rights and Gender Equality), under the responsibility of the *Direction générale de la cohésion sociale* (DGCS, General Directorate for Social Cohesion), within the Ministry of Solidarity and Health. It is responsible for the implementation of the recent national gender equality action plan that relies on a gender mainstreaming approach (*Plan interministériel en faveur de l'égalité professionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes*, PIEP, 2016-2020) and initiates gender equality plans within various ministries, such as the Ministry of Culture's *roadmap for gender equality 2018-2022*, the Minister's and labour union's *Memorandum of Understanding for gender equality at work* and sectoral plans to promote gender diversity such as a *sectoral plan to develop gender diversity in the digital sector* (2017-2020).

Gender equality policies are accompanied by two elected bodies, the *Délégation aux droits des femmes* and the *Délégation à l'égalité des chances entre les hommes et les femmes* (Delegations of Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities), one in the National Assembly and the other in the Senate. However, according to EIGE, they have limited resources and cannot propose amendments. Since February 2000, there has also been a *Délégation aux droits des femmes et égalité des chances* within the Economic, Social and Environmental Council.

As a service, the SDFE is at the lower level of the Ministry and has thus no authority in respect of other ministries' decisions, but its work is based on regional managements, department delegates and the coordination of 26 regional and 100 district Delegations for Women's Rights and Gender Equality, thereby providing France with a dense institutional network to implement a gender mainstreaming strategy.

The gender equality policy development of the government and the SDFE are accompanied by two important advisory boards: the *Conseil supérieur de l'égalité professionnelle entre les femmes et les hommes* (CSEP, Superior Council of Gender Equality at Work), a tripartite advisory body

⁵¹ For the results see: <https://storage.googleapis.com/en-marche-fr/COMMUNICATION/LaREM-restitution-egalite.pdf>

dedicated to gender equality in employment and working conditions, and the *Haut Conseil à l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes* (HCE, The High Council for Equality between Women and Men), an independent advisory body that replaced the *Observatoire de Parité* (Observatory on Parity, created in 1995) which provided expertise on gender balance in decision-making and monitored the implementation of equality laws in politics. The HCE steers a wide range of fields of action and is organised in five commissions (gender-based violence, gender stereotypes, European and international issues, equality in politics, administration, economics, and the social sphere; and sexual and reproductive health and rights). In 2014, the HCE provided a report and recommendations on tackling gender, social and territorial inequalities in *Politique de Ville* priority neighbourhoods (and fragile rural areas). Amongst the numerous recommendations figures to reflect urban and regional planning through the gender equality lens, and to support the development of adequate innovative practices. Also, the HCE recommends to systematically include the gender dimension in the *Politique de la Ville* contracts.

On the regional level, regional councils are the administrative units responsible for defining local policy, also on gender equality. Decentralised services such as the SDFE steer and control the regional or departmental implementation of national gender equality policy, but regional, departmental and local authorities in France initiate their own gender equality policies. The SDFE is part of the DGCS, while its regional authorities (DRDFE) are under the influence of regional prefects and its departmental delegates (DDDFE) are overseen by either departmental prefects or the corporate Devolution Administration of Social Cohesion.

DRDFEs are responsible for the implementation of inter-ministerial gender equality policy and the coordination of regional actors, development of partnerships, providing incentives for inter-departmental activities and knowledge-transfer on good practices. The DRDFE work structure foresees a regional delegate director, an assistant regional delegate director, an administrator and a departmental delegate and each DRDFE has one ministerial representative. The DRDFE work on small budgets, the larger part of the state budget for gender equality is according to the EIGE report dedicated to NGOs, most notably the *Fédération nationale des centres d'information sur les droits des femmes et des familles*, (FNCIDFF, National Federation of Information Centres on Women's Rights and Families).

On the local level, representatives for gender equality are embedded in the mayors working environment, with cross-departmental responsibility for gender equality.

Gender and social inequality in education

The *Chiffres-Clés* 2021 focus in education the tertiary academic level of education and the pathways into specific professions, such as the digital world. The following paragraph refers thus to Insee data (see annex), OECD data and EIGE data, and qualitative reporting within the primary and secondary educational sector. Whereas the OECD *Better Life Index* and the EIGE *Gender*

*Equality Report France 2020*⁵² indicate for France a relatively high gender equality in education, a more qualitative perspective leads to different results and call for action: EIGE does not differentiate between educational levels (from primary school to final educational stage) in its overall index result on knowledge, indicating there a slight decrease in gender equality between 2010 (56.6 points) and 2018 (score 55.2 points). However, the sub-domain of *segregation in education* the 2017 report indicates a far better result for women (score 41) than for men (score 21). This gap can in part be explained by the results of the analysis *"Filles et garçons sur le chemin de l'égalité"* (Girls and Boys on the Road to Equality; *Direction de l'évaluation, de la prospective et de la performance in education* (depp, 2021)), that explains gender differences in young people's educational success, in their choice of orientation and access to further education by qualitative analysis, pointing out that and how these differences have later impacts on employment integration, but also on professional and salary gender based inequalities. The report also mirrors the persistence of traditional professional role models until today. Established to be a kind of 'blue print', it provides a snapshot of France as a whole, to be pursued on the regional, departmental and individual educational institution level. The following quotes from the report, illustrate the detailed and differentiated perspective that is needed to work on gender inequality: *"At the beginning of primary schools, girls perform as well as boys in mathematics but much better in French. They maintain this advantage in French when they leave primary schools while repeating less often. In mathematics, however, they have lower results from CE1. [...] At the end of secondary school, girls have a better success rate in the diploma (DNB). They obtain better results in French than boys but less well in mathematics. After the DNB, girls are more likely to go into the general and technological stream and boys into the vocational stream, particularly apprenticeships. At secondary school and in apprenticeships, girls and boys follow different paths. Whether it is the general, technological or vocational route in secondary education, girls are less likely to go into scientific subjects, except those related to the health sector specialties, while boys are more likely to go for specialties in the health and social sector or in the clothing sector. [...] The choices made at secondary school are continued in higher education [...] In addition, women are also less likely than men to be enrolled in most scientific fields of study in higher education. On leaving initial training, women have more diplomas than men, but for the same diploma, they are less likely to be in employment with the same degree* (depp, 2022).

52 EIGE data have to be seen with cautiousness for this field because they combine for the indicator knowledge just attainment and participation in tertiary education and segregation in education which is not coherent to other data analysis of both OECD and national data.

The 2021 report of the *Observatoire des inégalités*⁵³ (Brunner & Maurin, 2021) confirms this observation on the level of both social and gender inequality, based on data from the *Ministère de l'Éducation nationale*, and *Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur*: The share of people without qualifications is lower in the younger generations, however almost a third of 25-29 year olds achieve at best a CAP (first certificates of achievement for apprentices and/or vocational *baccalauréat* students, awarded at the end of the first year of vocational school). Furthermore, while the children of working-class people account for 24% of pupils at the *collège*, they account for 34% of students in the vocational *baccalauréat*, but only 16% in the general first and final years of *baccalauréat*. The children of senior executives are slightly less numerous at *collège* (23%), but vice versa, they are rare in the vocational *baccalauréat* (8%) and much more present in the general first and final years (35%). In universities, children of executives are three times as many than the children of blue-collar workers, only 12% of undergraduate students have working-class parents and they represent only 8.5% of students in master studies and 5.9% in doctoral studies. This social sorting is similar to what the *grandes écoles* do, where only 7 % of the students have working class parents. However, with regard to gender inequality in the education system, girls have – on the academic level – overtaken boys. In the university system, there are six female students for every four male students. At the same time, Brunner & Maurin state that the feminisation of certain fields – particularly in engineering courses – is very slow. The share of women in engineering education has only increased six points between 2000-2001 and 2019-2020 (from 22% to 28%).

Employment of women

According to the *Chiffres-Clés 2021*, the present unemployment rates are in general more or less equal for women and men, regardless of age groups, but highest in the age group 15-24. Generally, women in employment account for the majority of part-time contracts, and in greater numbers in female-dominated occupation. Much more women work in areas where part time work is compulsory.

Gender difference was identified in many structural categories, in political representation and women leadership, in different professional fields and concerning awards within (above all academic) professions (for detailed data see the report), and these data are important pointers for *Doing Gender* in the respective areas. With regard to disadvantaged young people it is worth looking at the report's perspective on different urban areas (though these data are only in part

⁵³ The Observatoire des Inégalités (Observatory of Inequalities) is an NGO, building and transferring research-based knowledge on inequality in France, Europe and on an international level. It was founded in 2003, works independent from any religious organisation, political party, trade union or employer lobby and is funded by public institutions and research-oriented foundations.

differentiated by age): Women unemployment is 2.6 times higher in urban priority neighbourhoods than in other districts. Women's labour market participation rate remains lower than men's, notably for 25-49-year-olds (with a gender gap of 3.9 in the age group 15-24) and women are more at risk to belong to the working poor. Also, women living in urban priority neighbourhoods face a worse situation concerning the access to the labour market, and their access decreased between 2014 and 2019 by 2.7 %. Women's labour force participation in urban priority districts is tenuous compared to the one of men's and women's living in other urban areas: The share of active workers in a situation of unemployment⁵⁴ is 16.6% for women living in priority neighbourhoods, 6.8% for women living in other neighbourhoods and 5.6 for men living in priority neighbourhoods.

Gender difference among NEET

After the financial crisis, gender difference became obvious within the overall group of NEET: Their share within the young population increased more among young men (+2.9 points) than among young women (+1.3 points). The gender gap within the NEET continued to narrow between 2015 and 2019 (see also annex, map on female and male NEET, 2017/20). In 2019, in France mainland, the share of NEET among 15-29-year-old persons was however again higher for young women (13,7 % women, 12,1 % men). A closer look at these data leads to age as an important indicator for gender difference: Up to the age of 21, women are more likely to be in education and less likely to be NEET than men. This changes with the age of 22 onwards, the share of women amongst NEET increases. For men, the employment rate increases from the age of 20 onwards, compensating their lower share in initial training. For women, despite longer schooling and a lower overall unemployment rate, the employment rate increases less with age: they are more often inactive, often due to the birth of a child. On average between 2015 and 2019, among NEET, almost two out of three women aged between 25 and 29 are mothers, i.e. twice as many as among those in employment, education or training.⁵⁵

Gender difference in effects of the Covid-19 crisis in employment

According to the *Chiffres-Clés* 2021, the share of self-employed women and men having ceased all professional activity during the first lockdown is 63% amongst women and 35% amongst men. The share of employees planning to work part-time in the future to better handle their family

⁵⁴ Underemployment includes employed people who meet one of the following conditions: they are working part-time and/or they wish to work more and are available to do so (whether they are actively looking for a job or not) and/or they work part-time or full-time, but have worked less than usual during a given week due to partial unemployment (technical unemployment) or bad weather.

⁵⁵ Source: <https://www.Insee.fr/fr/statistiques/5346969>

responsibilities is 43% amongst women and 32% amongst men. Last but not least, 41% of women aged under 65 years stated a severe income decrease due to the Covid-19 crisis.⁵⁶

2.4.2. Local trends and policies

The City of Mulhouse has, as introduced in the generic description of the city, today its first women major, supported by an equality officer. They claim for Mulhouse as a city with a "*proactive gender equality policy*", such as setting up a municipal *Observatory on Domestic Violence and Violence Against Women* (2010), ongoing activities in the context of the programme *Mulhouse au féminin* (since 2017), support for female entrepreneurship with the project *D'ailes à Elles* (since 2019), the position of a municipal (2017), then deputy councillor (2020) for the promotion of all forms equality, the creation of a Mulhousian *Conseil d'Égalité* (Equality Council), and an annual monitoring of progress and failure in the field. With regard to the UPLIFT fields of interest, it is remarkable, that this monitoring addresses (at least in 2021) neither participation in urban development nor housing issues.

With regard to education, in 2018, the secondary educational levels of the population of Mulhouse show a stable situation which changes little from one year to the next. It should however be noted that still, 41% of women leave the school system without any training leading to a qualification (CAP/BEP), while only 35% of men have done so, reflects the difficulty women have in gaining access to higher education (Corneille/Lutz 2021). Also, in the tertiary education level, there hasn't been remarkable progress between 2012 (AURM analysis of students' backgrounds) and 2021 (AURM gender equality report Mulhouse): The UHA still shows a strong specialisation of orientations by gender. Women are stronger represented (more than 75%) the fields of literature and law, which offer fewer DUT (University Technical Diploma) and masters, but more licences. In contrast, courses in science, mechanics and information mechanics and information (with many DUTs) represent mens' worlds (more than 75% men).

60% of women aged 15 to 64 are in employment, whereas this figure is 74% for men in Mulhouse aged 15 to 64. The AURM however emphasises in its report *Égalité femmes hommes. Données clés, parcours et freins*, looking at the region with a focus on the city of Mulhouse, that this indicator does not sufficiently reflect the situation of women in relation to the labour market, as a high proportion of women are not in employment.

The report stresses also that this indicator does neither sufficiently reflect the situation of women in relation to the labour market, as a large proportion are inactive "housewives" or on fixed-term contracts or with fixed-term contracts. For the three types of employment contracts (short term, long term and permanent), the trend for 2019-2020 indicates according to Corneille & Lutz that

⁵⁶ For a very detailed analysis of the impact of the Covid-19 crisis see pp. 10-17 of the report.

in a context of clear decline in the job offer, due to the impact of the COVID health crisis, the situation of women on long-term fixed-term contracts deteriorated between 2019 and 2020 and is even less favourable when compared to the situation of men on long term contracts: There is a 4-point difference compared to the situation of men (-12% drop in long term contracts for women compared to a -9% drop for men). For short term contracts, men aged 50 and over were more affected by the decline in the job offer (-30% for men and -25% for women).

However, the report also indicates that in Mulhouse, with a majority of working class and employed population, the average wage gap between women and men is low compared to France. The difference in wages between men and women in Europe is on average 230€ net/month. This gap is higher in the Mulhouse agglomeration (334€) and in France (380€). The higher the CSP, the more abnormal is the wage gap: In France, women executives earn an average of 770€/month less than men, while this gap 90€/month for employees. The SMIC however puts men's and women's wages on an equal footing. The professions mainly concerned are white-collar and blue-collar workers. Science, mechanics and information are the fields which hire the most on long term in the region and hire mostly people with technical university diploma to be attained within two years (DUTs). In contrast, service and humanities sectors, moreover, generally offer more short-term contracts. Jobs in the industrial and chemical sectors (with a high proportion of men) are also those that are the most remunerative, unlike jobs in the social or health (sectors with a high proportion of women). For women, it is a double whammy: the fields in which they are encouraged to enter correspond little to the economic fabric and the pay is very low (AURM 2021c).

With regard to the representation of women in job categories, women represent 62% of category A, 53% of category B and 53% of category C (permanent and contractual staff combined). Technical staff represent 54% of the total workforce, but women are only 40% of the total. On the other hand, women are in the majority in the administrative field (83%). They predominate in the administrative, social, medico-social and animation fields, which is a trend that been observed for quite a while.

One of the conclusions of the report by Corneille & Lutz is that "The situation of women in Mulhouse, compared to other areas, is characterised by the greater economic and social fragility of some of them. Their over-representation can also be explained by the capacity of the city and its associations to welcome and support these people in their life paths" (ibid, p. 38). In terms of human resources policy, the shared action plan of the City of Mulhouse and m2A for the period 2021-2023 will endeavour to take appropriate measures to work on the inequalities observed. To do so, the municipality has set up several goals in the typical fields of women empowerment and participation, and entrepreneurship and digitalization as new fields to which women's access should be specifically promoted. To both fields, the pilot project of CSC Jean Wagner could be an interesting contribution. On a general level, the Mulhouse Equality Council (CME) is expected to

draw up an action plan involving the State, the Grand Est Region, the Collectivité Européenne d'Alsace and two Mulhouse associations.

3 Innovative post-crisis policies

As indicated in the previous chapters, there are different innovative policies in Mulhouse which address both long-term effects of the 2008 financial crisis, the educational/young people's unemployment crisis in France and in part already effects of the present Covid-19 crisis. As for youth work in the *Politique de la Ville* target areas, existing negative trends, particularly the strong social divide between the district Wolf Wagner and the rest of the agglomeration m2A, have been accentuated. The project *Coopération active et potentiel* (CAP, Cooperative action and potentials; funded in the Erasmus+ framework) of the *Jean Wagner Socio Cultural Centre* (*Jean Wagner CSC*) in Wolf Wagner district seems to deserve being considered as an innovative post-crisis policy to be learnt from: Though still being in its very beginning, the project has been selected to be presented in UPLIFT for two reasons: This is first the gate keeper role of the socio cultural centres for inclusion and participation and second, that the CAP project matches, with its multi-faceted goals, addressing both empowerment of young people and qualification of professionals, also with the capability approach pursued in UPLIFT.

Implementing the innovative policy: Jean Wagner Socio Cultural Centre

The French socio-cultural centres exist in all urban and rural structures and represent resource centres that offer services (early childhood, after-school care, leisure activities, social services, etc.), open to all inhabitants. This generation spanning approach is called '*multi-acceuil*'. Within the m2A agglomeration, Mulhouse has eight of these socio-cultural centres. One of them is *Jean Wagner CSC*, since 2013 located in a prestigious building of the architect Paul Le Querrec, *L'Origami*. The activities of the centre, located in the north-eastern pericentral part of the city and with an interface to the city centre, cover an exclusively *Quartiers Politique de la Ville* (QPV) territory. This territory includes the six districts in the immediate vicinity of the city centre, all undergoing major urban transformation: Vauban, Neppert, Sellier, Wolf, Wagner and Waldner. Their population of 17,000 inhabitants lives to a large extent in vulnerable situations. In 2016, 29% of them were foreign population and 27% had an immigration background (for a detailed analysis see *Jean Wagner CSC*, 2020, p. 17-37).

The centre itself is located in Wolf-Wagner district, that is structured around three homogeneous urban complexes: the *Cité Wagner* built in the 1950s, the *Cité-Jardin Wolf* built in the 1920s and an old housing block located between Boulevard de la Marseillaise and Avenue de Colmar. In 2007, the city's first Eco-Quartier was built in Wolf-Wagner district.

The French socio-cultural centres' role is to break isolation, prevent and reduce exclusion, encourage democratic debate and participation in urban planning and the socio-cultural context in general, and to strengthen solidarity between local communities and individual inhabitants. Their work is legally based on the national government's *Lettre circulaire N° 2012-013*, and the

Convention d'Objectif et de Gestion 2006-2009, an agreement between the government and the family allowance funds (*caisses d'Allocations familiales (Caf)*). This framework attributes to the centres the role of lead coordinator of the animation of local social life and cohesion (Jean Wagner CSC, 2021). To fulfil this role, a 'social project' has to be developed in a participatory process, and the socio-cultural centres are important actors in the context of the *Politique de la Ville* target areas, notably the *Quartiers Prioritaires Politique de la Ville* (QPPV). Jean Wagner CSC cooperates in this context with the municipal and the m2A governance structures and a large network of other institutional and civil society actors, and about 50 continuously engaged volunteers. It is an association that was created in 1964 on the initiative of residents of the Wagner district, supported by men and women involved in this collective action. The centre has today a board of directors that is composed of two groups, ex-officio members and members elected by the overall about 1520 members of the centre.

Analysis of young people's participation

The demographic analysis for the present social project *Faire sense* (Making sense, 2021-2024), indicates that proportion of young people in employment has between 2011 and 2016 fallen by 8% and represents 20% of the population. Since, the perimeter of *Jean Wagner CSC* loses a population aged between 20 and 25 (students and young workers), but comparing the age pyramid of 2016 with that of 2011, there is an increase in the share of people between 25 and 30 years old, with a significant representation of the male gender (80% of the 25-29 years old young people). 68% of the population in the target area depend on family allowance and 44% of young people living there lack a diploma (Jean Wagner CSC 2021, p. 18-24). Also, according to the expert interviews, the young population is not uniform in terms of computer skills and has thus to a different extent access to the digitalisation of many professional activities and a need of competence building.

Within the gender sensitive target group analysis for the development of the social project *Faire sens*, *Jean Wagner CSC* observed that the population attending its activities didn't seem to be representative of its main target area. Their contact with young people is vivid up to young people aged under 18, and is being renewed when they become parents themselves and use the 'multi-accueil activities'. Also, a large group of the female and male users lives in other areas of the city and comes to *Jean Wagner CSC* for its leisure rather than educational activities (Jean Wagner CSC 2021, p. 39; see also graph in the annex). The project *Coopération active et potential (CAP)* is one of the activities established in the context of the social project to improve young peoples capability

Concept of the CAP Erasmus+ project and state of project development⁵⁷

The *Coopération active et potential (CAP)* project is – as introduced above – linked to the *Politique de la Ville* target areas activities, in terms of the respective *Politique de la Ville* contracts, tools and instruments deployed in Mulhouse. The concept of the project was born out of a shared observation of various actors, notably youth work and youth employment actors, who identified that while the French and local educational and labour market support structures offer a number of labour market inclusion/qualification measures that pursue a more paternalistic, traditional ‘care-taking’ perspective of youth work, there is lack of empowerment orientated offers, to e. g. develop the spirit of enterprise for young people with lacking inclusion, in target areas of urban inclusion policies as well as in rural revitalisation areas.

The project has two target groups: youth professionals (youth and popular education workers), and young people with few labour market and social participation opportunities, living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The first objective of the project is to create in each European partner country a network of young people who shall have the opportunity to participate in the project. The professionals of the youth sector shall learn new forms of support (such as working with a ‘gamification approach’, less direct and standardised, and put young people and their collective project at the heart of the support.

The main objective is to enable 13-30 years old young people, based on an innovative and collaborative methodology, to develop a “power to act” in/on society and their environment and to return to the original definition of the ‘spirit of enterprise’, in terms of the original definition of youth entrepreneurship and cooperatives. This means amongst other, not to reduce youth entrepreneurship to a social enterprise perspective. According to the project partners and concept, the participation and commitment of young people in society must be able to cover all possible fields, and not just the field of the economy, even if it is the social and solidarity economy. In developing an appropriate structure to achieve this goal, the Canadian model of youth cooperative will serve as a point of reference, with the aim of transposing and adapting its methodology.

The direct and full participation of young people in this project will already be a first step towards empowerment. The main objective of the project is thus to give young people the means to become independent and socially active, and to give them / restore their desire to do so. Helping them to get involved in projects for the common good and the community is considered as an essential first step. Young people in fragile areas are particularly affected by difficulties in

⁵⁷ The text of this paragraph is to a large extent based on the project application, and additional information of/exchange with the project leader, Florence Faivre. We have to thank her for providing application documents and initial internal reports and for her cooperation with UPLIFT.

entering into a process of social or civic participation. To achieve its objective, the projects works with the following five project modules:

1. A training/action for youth workers (starting in July 2022 in Montreal - Canada) and elaborating a case study with young people and professionals involved in youth cooperatives.

2. A "toolbox" which will be the culmination of the activities to be carried out within the framework of the project, bringing together a set of documents and manuals enabling professional youth workers and professionals in the popular education sector to appropriate the cooperative concept, and to accompany cooperation projects with young people. The toolbox will be composed of several elements:

- an analysis of the characteristics, issues and impacts of the Canadian model,
- a collection of good practices of youth cooperatives,
- a "gender equality" guide,
- an implementation guideline and
- a manual "Youth cooperative, a tool against exclusion".

3. A digital 'escape game'. The project coordinators consider a 'gamification' of the young peoples self-consideration- and self-empowerment process as well as the learning process for cooperative entrepreneurship to be a relevant tool, both in terms of the target audience and the learning that it allows to be implemented. The acquisition and development of knowledge and skills is done at the same time as the action to be done in the game. This playful side of the concept was considered more appropriate than the methods applied in typical employment/qualification measures.

This escape game is based on the collection of good practices for youth cooperatives and uses as an input the methodological framework for the implementation of empowerment workshops by youth workers. The challenges in the virtual escape room will be designed to address skills such as team building, problem solving, problem-based learning, social-emotional learning skills (e.g. learning skills (self-awareness, self-management, decision-making, social awareness and relationship building, critical thinking).

4. A cooperative platform: It will be considered to develop a responsive collaborative platform, in order to make its use possible on all digital formats (computer, tablet, mobile). This platform, as an interactive learning space, is fully in line with the cooperative and participative approach of the project. The platform will be multilingual, with a first version in French and English, to ensure maximum visibility. But all the partners will be able to translate it into their own language. Multilingualism will be another way to highlight the European values of respect and diversity. The e-learning platform will be developed in Moodle or WordPress format.

5. Establishing cooperatives: The cooperatives could be ephemeral and legally supported by the local partners' structures or – in Mulhouse – also be embedded in the association of *Jean Wagner CSC*. The model is that of a real cooperative, with the values and principles that govern them (1 person/1 vote; pursuing with their action the interest of all members; profits at the service of the project etc.). The local partners help to develop the skills of the cooperatives who participate in the finance, HR and communication committees.

Organisation of the project

The project has an implementation period from 1/11/2021 to 31/10/2024 and is funded in Erasmus+ with a budget of 317,908 Euro. The lead partner and project-coordinator is *Jean Wagner CSC* in Mulhouse. The European and international partners are:

- ADPM: Association for the Defence of the Heritage of Mertolà, Portugal
- ALIMOS: Cooperative Society: Salvation in Food, Cesena, Italy
- WIDE: Women in Digital Initiatives, Luxembourg
- EMPHASYS: Interactive Solutions and Training, Nicosia, Cyprus
- ATERMON: Digital publishing & gamification company, Rotterdam, Netherlands
- CQCM: Conseil Québécois de la Coopération et de la Mutualité, Lévis, Canada

These partners contribute competence in youth work, participative reservation of cultural heritage, food cooperatives, women and digitalisation, training conceptualisation and gamification of knowledge building and learning processes. The *Conseil québécois de la Coopération et de la Mutualité* contributes knowledge transfer on the Canadian youth cooperative model and hosts the module 1 activities.

Each country has 2 French-speaking coordinators and participates with 3 youth workers who will go to Canada for training and follow the project throughout the whole implementation period. Each country participates with 10-15 young people to become members of a local cooperative, test and evaluate the tools. 6 of these young people will meet in Italy in 2023 to validate the options for a youth cooperative entrepreneurship. *Jean Wagner CSC* has 6 youth professionals involved in the project, the head of project, and 2 coordination assistants, the youth sector manager and the chief accountant on financial management.

State of the project development

The project started on 1 November 2021, with a (due to the pandemic digital) kick-off meeting in December 2021. The meeting included putting in place the elements necessary for project management: communication plan, risk and quality management, provisional planning, distribution of tasks and responsibilities between partners. Furthermore, the quality plan which takes up the steps in the narrative description was agreed. Given inner-organisational change to local partners withdrew at this stage from the project and a new local partner joined, a *Régie de*

Quartier (neighbourhood-management) located in Belgium. Also, an assessment of the competences (and training needs) of youth workers and social workers within the participating organisations was carried out, using the *European Portfolio* developed by the Council of Europe.⁵⁸

In the beginning of 2022, the content of module 1, the Quebec training programme, was elaborated, starting from the partner's needs, expectations, skills to be mobilised to achieve the results expected by the project and the territories involved. The training will take place at *Laval University* in Quebec City, with a scheduled intervention by the *Social Leadership Chair*, concerning the development of the power to act.⁵⁹ The youth workers of the five participating structures will attend the training in Quebec City at the beginning of July. To be eligible for the training, the professionals had to meet the following criteria: working face to face with the public, in the field, ability to imagine a capitalisation of the training's achievements in daily practice. On the formal side, mastery of French as main working language, ability to carry the project through the life of the project (training release clause until the end of 2023) and – last but not least – full vaccination in terms of Covid-19 health requirements had to be proven. For Mulhouse, 6 professionals will go on training and 15 professionals in total will participate.

Before leaving for Canada, the professionals involved will have identified, on their national territory, good practices enabling young people to become involved in the service of the common good in collective and cooperative entrepreneurship mode.

As for the module 5, the establishing of local youth cooperatives, young people who participate/ will develop an entrepreneurial project will be members of the cooperative. But in Mulhouse, membership will not be strictly restricted to young people. *Jean Wagner* CSC is currently considering to propose the cooperative model also to a group of migrant women who are learning French at the CSC to work on "cooking" projects in cooperative mode to raise funds for a travel/holiday project. Regardless the success in the field of Mulhousian youth work, this could be considered as indicator for the local feasibility and transfer of the approach still to be developed and tested in CAP.

At this stage of the project, the success of the work with young people cannot be evaluated: The mobilisation of young people for the project won't start before 2023. The youth mobility, on the test of the so far achieved project results will take place in the summer of 2023 in Belgium. Young Canadians will eventually join the group to exchange on their practice. In Mulhouse, the intention

⁵⁸ See <https://www.coe.int/fr/web/youth-portfolio/accueil>)

⁵⁹ See <https://www4.fsa.ulaval.ca/la-recherche/chaieres-de-leadership-en-enseignement/chaire-de-leadership-en-enseignement-sur-lengagement-social/>

is to ask the *Office Franco-Québécois pour la Jeunesse* to initiate an exchange between young Quebecers and young Mulhousians on cooperative entrepreneurship in 2023.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ See <https://www.cqcm.coop/education/jeune-coop/>

4 Discussion and conclusions

The analyses presented in the previous chapters illustrate national and local trends and policies in the domains of education, employment and housing (respectively the embeddedness of the latter in urban priority neighbourhood development as a key success factor to address youth inequality), and in policies promoting gender equality. This chapter aims at intertwining the findings in the investigated domains, to reflect on how socio-economic and gender inequalities are (re-)produced, and how they are being addressed. In continuity with UPLIFT Deliverable 1.2 (Inequality Concepts and Theories in Post-Crisis Europe), we discuss our findings on three levels of analysis: macro-level, meso-level and micro-level.

As for the macro-level, that is to say the development in the policy fields under consideration, in the period immediately after the financial crisis and throughout the current Covid-19 crisis, it is important to keep in mind that in this period significant political paradigm shifts have taken place for dealing with the inequality of young people, particularly for disadvantaged young people (NEET). The neo-liberalization process in France began later than in other European countries, and under the pressure of the European Union regarding France's competitiveness. Between 2008 and 2021, the governments under Nicolas Sarkozy, Francois Hollande and Emmanuel Macron pushed ahead a wide range of reform projects in labour market and social policy - partly bypassing the social partners. These policies – although only partially implemented – initiated the restructuring of the French capitalist model and were accompanied by a reduction in welfare state services and increasing privatisation of social security (Syrovatka 2016). Major reform projects addressed pension and unemployment insurance as well as – relevant for UPLIFT and presented in the previous chapters – the fight against youth unemployment and a reform of the education system. In labour market policy, an increasing deregulation and flexibilization of employment relationships can be observed.

Syrovatka speaks of an increasing hegemonic crisis of the political system in France, in the sense of Gramsci, in which the "old dies and the new cannot come into the world" (Gramsci 2012: 354, cf. *ibid* 2016). This seems to be particularly true in the educational sector, for gender equality policies/policies to promote disadvantaged groups, in that the apparent need for promotional instruments challenges the tabooing of e.g. ethnic origin-based inequality and thus the French equality principle of "*liberté, égalité et fraternité*" in general.

Political change goes also along with the movement *La République en Marche* initiated by Macron and the *gilets jaunes* (yellow-vests) protests that grew in reaction to his planned fuel tax: New political discourse formats emerged that, however, appear to have only limited connectivity for disadvantaged young people. Thus, local participation structures addressing young people, such as the youth board in Mulhouse, with its three age levels and a high participation of girls/young

women, or the civil society participants in the *Project Social* of the Jean Wagner district are – if successful to overcome barriers of class and ethnic culture – of great importance for capacity oriented development of youth policies.

The regional/local effectiveness of these reforms varies and can differ considerably - as shown for the *département Haut-Rhin*, the m2A assessed as FUA and Mulhouse as a city. Here, the prioritisation of institutional structures in the field of education and the labour market, which guide the implementation of public policies at the level of the *départements* and agglomerations, are decisive for the departmental implementation and development of policies to support disadvantaged young people. Regional governance structures (e.g. cooperation between the *département* and the agglomeration) that have been established in the last years gained more freedom in implementing state policies, and may thus be expected to achieve a more effective design of local plans for action and cooperation (e.g. cooperation of regional/local employers with the educational system or empowering young women in entrepreneurship).

With regard to the systemic linkage of the majority of policies aimed at combating social inequality among young people, the structurally reformed *Politique de la Ville* policy is to be considered as a central institution. However, *mixité* as a social and housing policy objective via the described housing policy approaches must be viewed critically, not least concerning the needs of disadvantaged young people. Housing challenges for young people are addressed in age-specific terms, but also – which is an important step towards a more gender sensitive planning and allocation policy – focused on the access of (in the majority female) single parents, large families or (in the majority female) older single people and the socio-spatial shifts of these groups to the periphery.

Experiences and reflections centred on local action in the field of housing allow based on this local research and according to Lelevrier (2018) from an academic perspective *"two or three perspectives: more alternatives in housing that would induce forms of reciprocity between social groups, to the benefit of the most modest; capacity for a better consideration of residential choice and trajectories; consideration of the diversity of local situations and experiences by the public housing actors; and finally, that of social justice through access to housing and the fight against ethnic discrimination."*

At the micro-level and drawing on the capability approach (e.g. Sen, 1999), the reflection of local implementation of education policies and policies that promote access to the labour market, allow not least according to local actors and evaluators of recent policy implementation the conclusion that the time has come for a re-definition of the objectives of equality policies and more empowerment- than care oriented youth-work and educational approaches. The bottom-up Mulhouse CAP-Erasmus+ project by CSC Jean Wagner or the top-down apprenticeship oriented secondary education concept are smaller and bigger milestones blocks for such transformation.

This would require a shift from “equality of opportunity” to a right on a “common base of knowledge, skills and culture” for all, namely a ‘fair equality of opportunity’, by ensuring that the fate of the most disadvantaged no longer depends on their initial positions (cf. chapter 2.1., cnesco 2016). Also, it would require that gender difference respectively intersectionality of gender and other criteria of discrimination are systematically taken in account in policy development and - evaluation – not only by gender disaggregated data, but in terms of a data-based re-distribution of budgets (as piloted in several programmes in 2020 before being gradually extended to other programmes; not yet documented for Mulhouse) and a reflection of how *Doing Gender* takes place in the implementation of these policies.

A reflection on how far a “learning of institutions”, in terms of creating innovative policies based on earlier experience in crisis management after the 2008 financial crisis took place, to better manage the present Covid-19 crisis, was hardly feasible in the context of this research. Analysing policy papers and the expert interviews allows however the conclusion, that the present crisis contributed to highlighting particular vulnerabilities of diverse groups of young people, notably vulnerabilities of women of different origins and family status, all more concerned by the risk of poverty and unequal access to education and labour when living in disadvantaged urban areas. Also the present crisis, intertwined with the increase of bottom-up democratic movements, seems to quicker and more precisely reveal fractures and weaknesses of existing policies against inequality and the actor-network structures to implement these than the financial crisis 2008 did.

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
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Annex


Map of the French Functional Urban Areas




Source: OECD (2020). Fact sheet Functional Urban Areas – France
<https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regionaldevelopment/France-bis.pdf>

Map of m2A Mulhouse (different types of territory, urban framework established in the context of the SCoT revision, June 2016)

Source: AURM 2019




NEET in France, women and men



Sources : Insee RP 2017, EPCI au 1^{er} janvier 2020 • Réalisation : Pôle ADT, Observatoire des territoires et Cartographie • Mars 2021


Source: <https://www.observatoire-des-territoires.gouv.fr/visiotheque/sofie-jeunes-femmes-et-jeunes-hommes-non-inseres>

Users of Jean Wagner CSC



Source: Jean Wagner CSC, 2021

Map Digital Fragility Index Mulhouse



Source: AURM 2021

UPLIFT data collection for Mulhouse

The table below contains data/indicators that are able to display social inequalities in a way that is the most comparable with other urban areas in Europe. Each urban report includes this data table, which is also intending to show not only the scale and dimensions of inequalities in the functional urban area, here the '*aire d'attraction de Mulhouse*', but indicate also the scale of missing data that makes any comparative research difficult to implement.

(Abbreviations : ns non significant, na non available, p provisional)

	National data (France)	Regional data NUTS 3 Département Haut-Rhin	FUA data Aire d'attraction Mulhouse FR040L2	City level data Commune de Mulhouse
Population				
Population in 2008	62 134 866	746 072	404 298	111 860
Population in 2013	63 697 865	758 723	410 800	112 063
Population in 2018	64 844 037	764 981	409 981	108 942
Population aged 15-29 in 2008	11 368 561	135 040	76 310	25 312
Population aged 15-29 in 2013	11 687 101	128 051	71 890	24 246
Population aged 15-29 in 2018	11 586 688	124 228	68 284	23 168
Income/poverty				
Gini index 2008	0,289	na	na	na
Gini index 2015	0,302	na	na	na
Gini index 2018	0,298	0,366	0,292	0,335
Equalized personal income quintiles (mean for the 1 st quintile) 2018	10,790 € (1 st +2 nd)/2	10,840 € (1 st +2 nd)/2	12,825 € (1 st +2 nd)/2	9,870 € (1 st +2 nd)/2

	National data (France)	Regional data NUTS 3 Département Haut-Rhin	FUA data Aire d'attraction Mulhouse FR040L2	City level data Commune de Mulhouse
Equalized personal income quintiles (mean for the 2 st quintile) 2018	16,830 € (3 rd +4 th)/2	18,800 € (3 rd +4 th)/2	18,255 € (3 rd +4 th)/2	13,365 € (3 rd +4 th)/2
Equalized personal income quintiles (mean for the 3 st quintile) 2018	21,545 € (5 th +6 th)/2	25,090 € (5 th +6 th)/2	23,225 € (5 th +6 th)/2	17,245 € (5 th +6 th)/2
Equalized personal income quintiles (mean for the 4 st quintile) 2018	27,195 € (7 th +8 th)/2	33,980 € (7 th +8 th)/2 2015	29,880 € (7 th +8 th)/2 2015	23,235 € (7 th +8 th)/2 2015
Equalized personal income quintiles (mean for the 5 st quintile) 2018	48,255 €	-	-	-
At risk of poverty rate 2008 (60% of the mean value 18,990€)	13%	10,7%	-	-
At risk of poverty rate 2013 (60% of the mean value)	14%	12,5%	-	-
At risk of poverty rate 2018 (60% of the mean value REV G1)	14,8%	12,9%	15,4%	33%
At risk of poverty aged 18-29 2008 (60% of the mean value)	16,7%	-	-	-
At risk of poverty aged 18-29 2013 (60% of the mean value)	20,5%	-	-	-
At risk of poverty aged 18-29 2018 (60% de la médiane REV G1)	22,2%	20,1%	23,3%	40%

Housing

	National data (France)	Regional data NUTS 3 Département Haut-Rhin	FUA data Aire d'attraction Mulhouse FR040L2	City level data Commune de Mulhouse
Share of social rental housing 2008**	15%	13%	13,5%	21%
Share of social rental housing 2013**	15%	13,3%	14,3%	24,1%
Share of social rental housing 2018**	15%	13%	14,4%	23,7% (27% social housing repertory)
Average housing price/average income 2008*	3,5 years	-	-	-
Average housing price/average income 2013*	4 years	-	-	2014 Existing flat 1,184€*m ² 2014 New flat 2,730 €*m ²
Average housing price/average income 2018*	4,5 years	Median price 2017 house 194,100 € Median price 2017 flat 1,470€*m ²	-	-

Education

Early leavers from education and training 2008 ISCED 0-2(collège) Share of inhabitants <ISCED3	36,6% m 32,4% f 40,4%	34,2% m 28,6% f 39,3%	-	44,7% m 41,3% f 47,9%
Early leavers from education and training 2013 ISCED 0-2 (collège)	32,2%	30,6%	32,5%	41,8%

	National data (France)	Regional data NUTS 3 Département Haut-Rhin	FUA data Aire d'attraction Mulhouse FR040L2	City level data Commune de Mulhouse
Share of inhabitants <ISCED3	m 28,7% f 35,3%	m 25,8% f 35,3%	m 28,1% f 36,6%	m 38,1% f 45,3%
Early leavers from education and training 2018 ISCED 0-2 (collège) Share of inhabitants <ISCED3	26,9% m 23,9% f 29,7%	m 21,6% f 23,4%	m 19,7% f 26,9%	m 34,7% f 40,5%
Share of inhabitants aged 15-64 with a maximum ISCED/ CITE 1 (2) education 2008 (école primaire)	30,2% m 27,1% f 33%	30,1% m 25,2% f 34%	31,1%	40,6% m 37,8% f 43,1%
Share of inhabitants aged 15-64 with a maximum ISCED/CITE 1 (2) education 2013 (école primaire)	-	-	-	-
Share of inhabitants aged 15-64 with a maximum ISCED/CITE 1 (2) education 2018 (école primaire)	21,4% m 19,2% f 23,4%	21,9% m 18,2% f 25,4%	22,4% m 18,9% f 25,6%	33,3% m 30,3% f 36,2%
Enrolment in upper secondary school (lycée) fall 2008 (CITE 3)	5,339 million	-	-	-
Enrolment in upper secondary school (lycée) fall 2013	5,472 million	-	-	-
Enrolment in upper secondary school (lycée) fall 2018	5,654 million	23,600 high school pupils class 10+11+12	-	-

	National data (France)	Regional data NUTS 3 Département Haut-Rhin	FUA data Aire d'attraction Mulhouse FR040L2	City level data Commune de Mulhouse
Employment				
NEET youth aged 15- 29 (2008) (share; gender)	m 10,6% f 14,6%	16,5%	18,1%	25,8%
NEET youth aged 15- 29 (2013) (share; gender)	m 12,3% f 15,3%	19,0%	20,5%	27,7%
NEET youth aged 15-29 (2018) (share; gender)	m 12,1% f 13,2%	17,5%	19,2%	25,2%
employment rate 2008 (actifs) EMP T1	71,7%	73,7%	71,3%	68,1%
employment rate 2013 (actifs) EMP T1	73,3%	74,6%	72,2%	67,8%
employment rate 2018 (actifs) EMP T1	74,3%	75,6%	73,7%	66,8%
employment rate aged 15-24 2008 (actifs EMP T2)	43,2%	49,9%	-	45,1%
Employment rate aged 15-24 2013 (actifs EMP T2)	43%	48,7%	45,3%	42,6%
Employment rate aged 15-24 2018 (actifs EMP T2)	40,3%	46,7%	43,3%	39,8%
Unemployment rate 2008 (**census rate EMP T1)	8%	8,4%	9,6%	15,5%
Unemployment rate 2013 (**census rate EMP T1)	9,6%	10,2%	11,4%	18,3%

	National data (France)	Regional data NUTS 3 Département Haut-Rhin	FUA data Aire d'attraction Mulhouse FR040L2	City level data Commune de Mulhouse
Unemployment rate 2018 (**census rate EMP T1)	9,6%	10,1%	11,3%	18,3%
Unemployment rate aged 15-24 2008 (**census rate EMP T1)	22,6%	23,7%	na	37%
Unemployment rate aged 15-24 2013 (**census rate EMP T2)	28,2%	28,7%	33,5%	43,1%
Unemployment rate aged 15-24 2018 (**census rate EMP T2)	26,4%	25,8%	29,1%%	38,9%
Share of precarious employment CDD BIT definition (T402) 2008	12,37%	-	-	-
Share of precarious employment CDD BIT definition (T402) 2013	13%	-	-	-
Share of precarious employment CDD BIT definition (T402) 2017	13,8%	-	-	-
Share of precarious employment CDD BIT definition aged 15-24 2008	26,2%	-	-	-
Share of precarious employment CDD BIT definition aged 15-24 2013	28,7%	-	-	-
Share of precarious employment CDD BIT definition aged 15-24 2017	30,4%	-	-	-

	National data (France)	Regional data NUTS 3 Département Haut-Rhin	FUA data Aire d'attraction Mulhouse FR040L2	City level data Commune de Mulhouse
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Health

Life expectancy at birth 2008	m 78,0 f 84,7	m 78,3 f 84,3	ns	ns
Life expectancy at birth 2013	m 78,8 f 85,0	m 79,0 f 84,4	ns	ns
Life expectancy at birth 2018	m 79,6 f 85,5	m 79,9(p) f 84,7(p)	ns	ns
Teenage birth rate 2008	1,8%	na	ns	ns
Teenage birth rate 2013	1,7%	na	ns	ns
Teenage birth rate 2018	1,2%	1 < 1,5%	ns	ns

Sources:

Most data in this collection may be researched at the *Institut national de la statistique et des économies*, INSEE, within the INSEE "Dossier complet de territoire 2018" (<https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/zones/2011101>), for the 4 levels of territories. For previous years data are available in INSEE „Recensement de la population“, data set from 2006 to 2017" (<https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2008354>). Also, the local implementation plans for the National urban development programmes provide data on the level of the agglomeration m2A than on the FUA level. Data on **income and Gini-Index** are available at the *Agence Nationale de la cohésion du territoire*, on the website of the *Observatoire des Territoires* (<https://www.observatoire-des-territoires.gouv.fr/>). In addition Data of *Crédit Logement and from the **Census were used for the provision of housing data. **Education** data are available on the site of the *Ministère de l'éducation nationale, de la jeunesse et du sport* (<https://www.education.gouv.fr/publications-rapports-et-statistiques-286058>) but these are mostly at national level. **Health** data are available on the site of the *Institut national d'études démographiques* (INED), <https://www.ined.fr/fr/tout-savoir-population/chiffres/france/mortalite-cause-deces/esperance-vie/>. **Data on housing** are available within the Census data and on the site of *Crédit logement* <https://www.observatoirecreditlogement.fr/>. For the local level, many detailed data are also available in the PLH m2A (*Programme local de l'habitat de l'agglomération de Mulhouse*), covering Mulhouse and 38 other municipalities around.